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CHAPTER I 
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN BANK ACTIVITY 
IN THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 
Introduction; A Description of the Euro-dollar Market 
There Is an extensive body of descriptive literature deal­
ing with the Euro-dollar market. Paul Einzlg's The Euro-dollar 
System^ contains a thorough description of the historical develop­
ment and institutional framework of the market. The Euro-dollar 
2 Market , by E. Wayne Clendenning, is a policy-oriented monograph 
dealing with the Euro-dollar market. Most of the descriptive lit­
erature pertaining to the Euro-dollar market is found in the finan­
cial press rather than in professional journals or monographs. 
The t&rm "Euro-dollar" refers to dollar-denominated deposits 
held In banks outside the United States, including such deposits in 
foreign branches of United States banks. These Euro-dollar balances 
are not limited to European banks, despite what one might infer from 
the term "Euro-dollar." 
The Euro-dollar market might best be viewed as a wholesale 
market for dollars among banks outside the United States. This mar­
ket is well-developed in many parts of the world, with major Euro-
^Paul Einzig, The Euro-dollar System (New York: St. 
Martin's Press Inc., 1967). 
2 E. Wayne Clendenning, The Euro-dollar Market (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970). 
2 
dollar markets existing In London, Paris, Frankfort, Amsterdam, Zurich, 
Basle, Geneva, Milan, Vienna, Beirut, Tel-Aviv, Cairo, Liverpool, and 
3 Tokyo. The London market is by far the largest and most active. 
Due to the international nature of the Euro-dollar market 
most Euro-dollar business transactions are executed by the foreign 
exchange departments of the various banks involved. The familiarity 
of foreign exchange department personnel with the business standings 
of foreign banks facilitates rapid transactions of unsecured telephone 
lending and borrowing. The typical transaction is between two foreign 
exchange departments; however, the services of Euro-dollar brokers 
are also used. 
The Euro-dollar market has been recognized as such only 
since 1957, even though deposits in terms of foreign currencies far 
antedate this year. There is evidence that transactions at medieval 
fairs Included payments out of and into foreign currency deposits,^ 
and a substantial business in dollar and sterling deposits emerged 
in Berlin and Vienna in the 1920s.^ The Euro-dollar market is a 
new development only in that it constitutes a broad international 
market in foreign currency deposits and involves an international 
"The Euro-Currency Business of Banks in London," Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin. Volume X (March, 1970), 32. 
^Elnzlg, The Euro-dollar System, pp. 3-5, Paul Einzlg, 
The History of Foreign Exchange (London, Macmlllan and Co., Ltd., 
1962), pp. 70-73." 
^Jane Sneddon Little, "The Euro-dollar Market: Its Nature 
and Impact," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic 
Review. May/June 1969, p. 4. 
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structure of Interest rates, largely independent of any single na­
tions domestic rates. 
The origins of the modern Euro-dollar market can generally 
be traced to the early post World War II period. After World War 
II, the United States held most of the world's monetary gold reserves, 
and of necessity other countries held foreign currency (particularly 
dollars and pounds sterling) as part of their official reserve assets. 
Due to the reconstruction policies of the postwar period, and the 
fact that the United States remained the world's largest exporter, 
the dollar became the world's strongest and most freely convertible 
currency. The dollar evolved as an acceptable means of international 
payment and as the world's most important reserve asset.^ 
Since much of the balance-of-payments deficit of the early 
post-World War II era resulted from United States Foreign Aid under 
the Marshall plan, many dollars were transferred directly to the 
accounts of foreign official monetary institutions. These institutions 
began seeking investment opportunities for a portion of their dollar 
balances and were able to place these balances in the New York money market 
banks. The New York banks were experiencing high loan demand from 
the European private sector where dollars were being used to finance 
international trade. Even though the New York money market banks acted 
to channel most of the dollar investments of foreign official monetary 
^For a discussion of whether the U. S. position as a reserve 
currency country is a blessing or a curse see: Robert Z. Aliber, 
"The Costs and Benefits of the U. S. Role as a Reserve Currency 
Country," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume LXXVII (August, 
1964), 442-56. 
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institutions to private European borrowers during the 1950's, a European 
market for dollar deposits was developing throughout this period. 
This development was strongly reinforced in the 1950*8 when 
East European banks, influenced by cold war pressures, chose to deposit 
their dollar balances with their London and Paris correspondents rather 
than their New York correspondents. In 1957 the British, after a series 
of balance-of-payments crises, restricted the use of pounds sterling 
for financing non-sterling trade. At this point British bankers, 
attempting to maintain London's position of eminence in international 
finance, actively sought to develop a London market for dollar deposits. 
By 1958, when most currencies had become freely convertible due to 
the removal of post-World War II exchange controls, an active Euro­
dollar market had been developed in London. 
The persistence and growth of the Euro-dollar market was stim­
ulated by interest rate differentials between various national credit 
systemsUnless rates on Euro-dollar deposits are higher than rates 
on dollar deposits in the United States, and unless Euro-dollar loan 
rates are lower than rates on domestically available credit, there is 
little reason for people either to hold Euro-dollar deposits or demand 
Euro-dollar loans. If depositors can receive a higher return on their 
dollar deposits in the United States than in the Euro-dollar market, 
few will choose to make Euro-dollar deposits. If borrowers can borrow 
^For a discussion of interest rate differentials and Inter-
natioal capital flows see: Patrie H. Hendershott, "The Structure 
of International Interest Rates: The U. S. Treasury Bill Rate and 
the Euro-dollar Deposit Rate," The Journal of Finance, Volume XXII 
(September, 1967), 455-65. 
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domestic currency and buy dollars in the foreign exchange market more 
cheaply than they can borrow Euro-dollars, then few will choose to 
borrow in the Euro-dollar market. Euro-dollar loan rates must also 
compete with United States rate offerings when United States financial 
institutions are free to offer loans internationally. 
The United States deposit rates, therefore, set lower limits on 
Euro-dollar deposit rates; however, the United States loan rates only 
approximate the upper limits of the Euro-dollar loan rates. Since 
United States banks, unlike European banks, often require loan cus­
tomers to maintain compensatory balances, the "effective" United 
States loan rate as viewed by European borrowers is approximately 
20 percent above the nominal United States loan rate. It should 
also be noted that many European borrowers who might be allowed the 
prime rate in Europe cannot obtain the prime rate when borrowing in 
the United States. 
Since the executive order of 1965 extended the application of 
the Interest Equalization Tax of 1964 to short-term non-export loans 
to foreigners made by United States banks, Euro-dollar loan rates 
have been less affected by United States loan rates. Euro-dollar 
loan rates have been able to rise as high as domestic loan rates. 
When the major trading nations of the world removed their 
post-World War II exchange controls in 1958 the Euro-dollar market was 
free to expand. The existence of the requisite rate differentials was 
a major force in the expansion which followed the return to freely 
convertible currencies. During the 1958-59 period Regulation Q ceilings 
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of 2-1/2 percent applied to 90-180 day deposits, while the Euro­
dollar deposit rates were at levels of 3-7/8 to 4 percent. United States 
banks were charging an "effective" loan rate of 5-3/4 percent, while 
Euro-dollar banks were offering loans at 4-1/2 to 5 percent. Domestic 
rates in Europe were high due to boom conditions, and the Euro-dollar 
market became a very popular financial institution. By 1960 the Euro­
dollar market had attained a size of approximately one billion dollars. 
From the outset of the Euro-dollar market a major portion of 
the Euro-dollar deposits came from foreign official dollar deposits 
redeposlted in European commercial banks . It is estimated that around 
the middle of 1962 these official deposits accounted for two-thirds of all 
Euro-dollar deposits. These deposits continue to constitute the major 
source of funds in the Euro-dollar market. The second most important 
suppliers of funds to the Euro-dollar market are commercial banks, 
which hold Euro-dollar deposits on behalf of their clients as well 
as their own deposits acquired in connection with Interest arbitrage. 
This is not to say, however, that European banks reduce their dollar 
working balances In New York banks in favor of Euro-dollar deposits. 
These working balances are necessary to insure dollar liquidity and 
to facilitate international financial transactions. 
In addition to the foreign official institutions and foreign 
commercial banks, large firms of international standing having signif­
icant business in the United States are also major Euro-dollar de­
positors. Of particular importance among this group are insurance 
companies, oil companies, and the major tobacco companies. Foreign 
7 
subsidiaries of United States firms were also large Euro-dollar de­
positors until 1965, when they were required by the Direct Foreign 
Investment Program to repatriate these balances. While insurance com­
panies are usually Euro-dollar depositors, the other firms are bor­
rowers as often as they are depositors. 
In the 1960's, particularly during and after 1966, the 
London and Paris branches of large United States banks constituted 
the most important group of Euro-dollar borrowers. They used some of 
these funds to finance European subsidiaries of United States firms 
and to finance international trade, but the most significant part of 
these funds were lent to their parent banks in the United States 
where they were used to finance domestic trade. United States banks 
have continued to borrow Euro-dollars from their foreign branches, and 
it is this practice, together with its monetary policy implications, 
which is the topic of this study. 
The Euro-dollar Market and Domestic 
United States Monetary Policy" 
The borrowing of Euro-dollars by United States banks Is rele­
vant to United States domestic monetary policy in that these borrowed 
funds have, at times, been used as a source of excess reserves during 
^Several descriptive articles have been published dealing 
with this topic, for instance: Fred H. Klopstock, "Euro-dollars 
in the Liquidity and Reserve Management of United States Banks," 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, Volume L (July, 
1968) 130-138. Andrew F. Brimmer, "Euro-dollar Flows and the 
Efficiency of U. S. Monetary Policy," (paper presented before a 
conference on Wall Street and the Economy 1969 at the New School 
for Social Research, New York, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, March 8, 1969) . 
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periods of tight domestic monetary policy. During the tight money 
periods of the past decade the Euro-dollar market has evolved as an 
important source of funds for United States banks. During the 1966 
tight money period, United States banks increased their Euro-dollar 
borrowings from overseas branches by $2.7 billion, from $1.6 billion 
in January 1966 to $4.3 billion in November of 1966. During the tight 
money period of the first half of 1969 their borrowings increased by 
92 percent, from $7.5 billion in January 1969 to $14.4 billion in July 
of 1969. By June of 1969 Euro-dollar borrowings of large New York 
banks reached a total of more than twice that of their outstanding 
CDs -
The Euro-dollar market has been recognized as an avenue 
through which United States banks have been able to cushion the 
effects of restrictive domestic monetary policy by Increasing their 
excess reserves. At times when domestic money rates have exceeded 
Regulation Q ceilings, United States barks with foreign branches have 
been able to bid aggressively for funds in the Euro-dollar market 
because funds acquired by foreign branches are not subject to Regula­
tion Q ceilings. 
When the foreign branch of a United States bank borrows Euro­
dollars for Its parent, the lending bank is instructed to have its 
United States correspondent transfer the amount of the loan to the 
branch's account in Its parent bank. This transfer is executed by 
means of a cashier's check and the parent bank's "cash items in 
the process of collection" (C.I.P.C.) is increased. This increase 
in C.I.P.C. reduces the net demand deposits against which reserves 
9 
are required of the parent bank. "Canh items in the process of 
collection and du« from other banks" is deducted from gross demand 
deposits when computing requirea reserves to avoid holding banks 
responsible for reserves on deposits before they have received the 
cash transfers which correspond to these new deposits. Thus Euro­
dollar borrowings increase the "cash items in the process of collection 
and due from other banks" of the parent bank in addition to transferring 
funds from demand deposits of one United States bank to "due to 
own foreign branches" of the parent bank. At times the reduction in 
an individual bank's gross dem.?,nd deposits due to increases in 
C.I.P.C. has not been offset at the time of Euro-dollar repayment. 
The accounting positions of the. banks involved in this Euro-dollar 
transaction are depicted in Chart 1.1. Part A of Chart 1.1 depicts the 
bank positions while the Euro-dollar transaction is being cleared, 
and Part B depicts their positions after clearing. 
The effects on excess reserves of these transactions have var­
ied as the Federal Reserve System has amended reserve requirements on 
Euro-dollar borrowings as specified in Regulations D and M. For de­
scriptive purposes these effects will be categorized into four periods: 
the pre-July 1969 period; the July 1969-September 1969 period, the 
September 1969-January 1971 period, and the post-January 1971 period. 
The Pre-July 1969 Period 
Prior to the Amendment to Regulation D of July 31, 1969, Euro­
dollar borrowing activities by U. S. banks were virtually free from 
reserve related regulation. Parent bank liabilities to foreign 
Chart 1.1 
The Accounting of Euro dollar Borrowings 
Part A 
U. S. Parent Bank 
CIPC + X + X Due to 
own foreign 
branches 
Foreign Branch Foreign Bank 
U. S. Correspondent 
of Foreign Bank 
Due + X + X Due to Deposits — X Demand 
from parent foreign bank with U. S. deposit of 
bank correspon­ foreign corres 
dent — X pondent 
Loans to + X Cashiers 
foreign check out­
branches standing 
+ X 
Part B 
Reserves + X Due to Due + x + X Due to Deposit Reserves — X Demand 
+ X own foreign from parent foreign bank with U. S. - X deposit of 
branches bank correspon­ foreign 
dent — X correspondent 
Loans to 
foreign 
branches 
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branches were not subject to reserve requirements. During this period 
Euro-dollar borrowings reduced the demand deposits of the lender's 
United States correspondent and thus reduced this bank's excess reserves 
by one minus the reserve ratio times the amount of the Euro-dollar bor­
rowings ([l-r]x). The parent bank's excess reserves were Increased 
by the full amount of the Euro-dollar borrowings (x), while the banking 
system's excess reserves were Increased by an amount equal to the 
demand deposit reserve requirement ratio times the amount of the 
Euro-dollar borrowings (-[l-r]x + x = rx). 
Insofar as Euro-dollar borrowings allowed the banking system 
to acquire increased totals of earning assets from a given quantity 
of reserves, they were similar to other nondeposit sources of funds 
such as Federal funds; however, Euro-dollar borrowings had other 
advantages which also made them attractive to bankers seeking excess 
reserves. Funds acquired through Euro-dollar borrowings (net lia­
bilities of parent banks to their own foreign branches) were not 
and are not subject to FDIC fees. The time required to clear fund 
transfers among United States banks, particularly in cases involv­
ing the New York Clearing House, afforded an additional advantage 
to Euro-dollar borrowings as compared to other sources, which are 
quickly cleared by wire. The reduction in net demand deposits 
of the parent bank, which resulted from Interbank fund transfers 
executed with cashier's checks, converted required reserves to excess 
reserves for the duration of the clearing period (usually one day). 
Short-term additions to the excess reserves of the parent bank 
12 
(and thus the banking system) were created by this increase in 
"cash items in the process of collection and due from other banks" 
in amounts equal to the demand deposit reserve ratio times the 
quantity of Euro-dollar borrowings (rx). Thus parent banks received 
a bonus when borrowing Euro-dollars, and they were able to avoid 
offsetting these reductions in reserve requirements by repaying 
their liabilities to foreign branches with bills payable checks 
(or officer's checks) which, unlike cashier's checks, were excluded 
from demand deposits subject to reserve requirements. By borrowing 
overnight Euro-dollars daily ("rolling over" their overnight Euro­
dollar borrowings), banks were able to maintain levels of "due 
from other banks" and thus convert their short-term benefit into 
a permanent one. 
The July 1969-September 1969 Period 
Amendment D was amended as of July 31, 1969 "to insure that 
officer's checks issued by a member bank or by or on behalf of a 
foreign branch of a member bank on an account maintained by such 
branch with a domestic office of the parent bank are included by the 
member bank as deposits for purposes of computing its reserve 
9 
requirement." 
After July of 1969 parent banks were no longer able to avoid 
offsetting the reductions in net demand deposits associated with Euro­
dollar borrowings. The clearing process bonus associated with Euro-
^See Appendix B for the text of the Amendments to Regulations 
D and M. 
13 
dollar borrowings was eliminated by requiring banks to Include officer's 
checks in gross demand deposits during the clearing of Euro-dollar re­
payments . 
The September 1969-Januarv 1971 Period 
The September 4, 1969, Amendments to Regulations D and M 
placed a 10 percent marginal reserve requirement on parent banks* 
net liabilities to their foreign branches in excess of the parent 
bank's Euro-dollar borrowing base. This base was defined as the 
parent bank's average-dally outstanding net liabilities to its foreign 
branches in the four-week period ending May 28, 1969. 
The reserve requirement on demand deposits at large city banks 
(which are the banks that borrow in the Euro-dollar market) has been 
fixed at 17-1/2 percent since April 17, 1969. During the period from 
September 1969 to January 1971 Euro-dollar borrowings reduced the ex­
cess reserves of the lending bank's United States correspondent by 
82-1/2 percent of the amount of the Euro-dollar borrowing. The parent 
bank's excess reserves were increased by 90 percent (100 percent minus 
the 10 percent reserve requirement on liabilities to own foreign 
branches). Thus the banking system experienced an increase in excess 
reserves of 7-1/2 percent (or the demand deposit reserve ratio, 17-1/2 
percent, minus the Euro-dollar borrowings reserve ratio, 10 percent) 
of the Euro-dollar borrowings. 
The 1969 Amendments to Regulations D and M represent attempts 
to control the excess-reserve creating aspects of Euro-dollar borrowings 
by United States banks. In June of 1970 Regulation Q ceilings were 
14 
removed from $1,000,000 CD's in order to encourage United States banks 
to compete for funds In domestic markets rather than turning to the 
Euro-dollar market. 
The Post-January 1971 Period 
By the middle of 1969 United States banks had begun repaying 
their Euro-dollar borrowings in mass quantities, and many banks were 
eroding their reserve-free bases. Due to erosions of the United States 
official reserves balance of payments the Federal Reserve System 
amended Regulations D and M in January 1971 in order to retard this 
repayment of Euro-dollar borrowings. Regulations D and M were amended 
to Increase the Euro-dollar reserve requirement to 20 percent and re­
define the reserve-free base for Euro-dollar borrowings, lîils new 
definition incorporated a more inclusive automatic downward adjust­
ment mechanism in order to discourage parent banks from eroding these 
reserve-free bases.Given the Euro-dollar marginal reserve require­
ment of 20 percent (which exceeds the 17-1/2 percent demand deposit 
reserve requirement), the banking system would experience a decrease 
in excess reserves when Euro-dollar borrowings exceed the reserve-
free base. The borrowing bank would receive an addition to Its 
excess reserves in an amount equal to only 80 percent of its Euro-dollar 
borrowings) and the lenders United States correspondents would experi­
ence a reduction in its excess reserves by an amount equal to 87-1/2 
percent of the Euro-dollar borrowing. 
lOgee Appendix B for the text of the Amendments to Regulation 
D and M. 
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The 1971 Amendments to Regulation D and M represent attempts 
to control Euro-dollar repayments because of their effects on the 
United States balance of payments. Both the Import-Export Bank and 
the United States Treasury made special securities available to foreign 
branches of United States banks In 1971 In order to remove dollars 
from foreign markets and thus improve the official reserve balance. 
The Treasury issue of April 1971 was made in conjunction with the 
Federal Reserve System's April, 1971 Amendment to Regulation M which 
allowed these securities to be Included in the parent bank's reserve-
free base. 
Euro-dollar Borrowings and the United States 
Balance of Payments^^ 
Although Euro-dollar borrowing activities by United States 
banks do not affect the United States balance of payments accounts 
in a direct accounting sense, they do have a highly significant 
effect on the United States balance of payments as computed on the 
official reserve transactions basis. This balance is the net dollar 
holdings of foreign official monetary Institutions and it is often 
used as an indication of the international position of the dollar. 
Since the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, the members (now 
numbering 118 countries) of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) 
have agreed to maintain relatively fixed exchange rates with respect 
l^Several descriptive articles dealing with this topic have 
been published in the financial press, for instance: Joseph 
Kvasnicka, "Euro-dollars—An Important Source of Funds for American 
Banks," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Business Conditions, June 
1969, pp. 8-10. 
16 
to the dollar, and the United States has agreed to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate of $35 per ounce between gold and the dollar. Foreign 
official monetary institutions have agreed to enter their foreign ex­
change markets as purchasers and suppliers of dollars in order to 
maintain exchange rate stability. 
When United States banks borrow heavily in the Euro-dollar 
market (increasing the demand for Euro-dollars) upward pressure is 
exerted on the Euro-dollar deposit rate. The Euro-dollar market offers 
an Investment opportunity to foreign investors and has the potential 
of attracting dollars out of foreign exchange markets and foreign 
official monetary institutions. When rates on Euro-dollar deposits 
exceed foreign domestic rates, foreign-held dollars flow into the 
Euro-dollar market and foreign investors exchange their domestic 
currency for dollars which they place in the Euro-dollar market. 
These transactions reduce the supply of and increase the demand 
for dollars in foreign exchange markets; and, ceteris paribus lead 
foreign official monetary institutions to purchase their domestic 
currencies with dollars, thus reducing their dollar assets and im­
proving the official reserve transactions basis of the United States 
Balance of Payments. 
As United States banks repay large quantities of Euro-dollars 
(increasing the supply of Euro-dollars) a downward pressure is exerted 
on the Euro-dollar rate, which, ceteris paribus, leads to a flow of 
this study is being completed the Bretton Woods Agree­
ments are in suspension and attempts are being made to revise the 
international payments mechanisms. 
17 
funds out of the Euro-dollar market and Into foreign domestic markets. 
This flow of funds leads foreign official monetary institutions to 
purchase dollars for purposes of exchange stability, and these pur­
chases adversely affect the official reserve transactions basis of the 
United States Balance of Payments. These effects are presented in 
Charts 1.2 and 1.3. 
Scope of the Study 
United States bank behavior in the Euro-dollar market has 
become a topic of major concern to United States policy makers. It 
is the objective of this study to analyze the theoretical and empirical 
economic determinants of Euro-dollar borrowings by United States banks. 
A theoretical derivation and empirical tests of the demand function 
of United States banks for Euro-dollar borrowings will be presented. 
The empirical examination is applied to the period from December 
31, 1964, to April 2fi, 1971. 
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Chart 1.2 
Euro-dollar Borrowings and Improvement in the 
Official Reserves Transactions Basis of the 
United States Balance of Payments 
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Chart 1.3 
Euro-dollar Repayments and Worsening of the 
Official Reserve Transactions Basis of the 
United States Balance of Payments 
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CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
llie model used in this study derives from the work of 
1 2 Dudley Luckett and Carl Vander Wilt. Luckett's analysis is con­
cerned with the customer relationship, while Vander Wilt's is con­
cerned with determinants of member bank borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve; however, both of these studies use a microeconomic portfolio 
optimization approach as the theoretical model with which to analyze 
bank behavior. 
Bryan and Aigner have argued that the literature concerned 
with short-run bank behavior may be grouped into two categories: 
that which considers the bank as a microeconomic unit in the tra­
ditional theory of the firm and develops models of optimization; 
and that which makes use of the traditional stock adjustment model. 
The model used in this study combines a microeconomic analysis with 
a stock adjustment model in order to analyze the behavior of indivi­
dual banks as Euro-dollar borrowers. It is a stock adjustment model 
^Dudley G. Luckett, "Credit Standards and Tight Money," 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Volume II (November, 1970) 
420-34% 
O 
Carl Eugene Vander Wilt, Member Bank Borrowing; A Micro-
economic Approach, (unpublished thesis, Iowa State University, 1968). 
^Dennis J. Aigner and William P. Bryan, "A Model of Short 
Run Bank Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume LXXXV 
(February, 1971) 97-99. 
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with the desired level of Euro-dollar borrowings determined by a 
utility maximization assumption with profit, liquidity and soundness 
as arguments in the utility function. 
The banker Is assumed to formulate a desired level of Euro­
dollar borrowings, E$B*, based on the position of his bank at t-1. 
In order to maximize utility and thus reach equilibrium the banker 
must reach a level of Euro-dollar borrowings equal to E$B* at time 
t; therefore his utility maximizing change in Euro-dollar borrowings 
between t-1 and t must be E$B* - E$B . The banker may be unable to 
t t—1 
reach equilibrium in a single time period in which case his change In 
Euro-dollar borrowings is some fraction of E$B* - E$B^_2. 
Changes in Eurodollar borrowings may be expressed as: 
(1) AE$B = Y(E$B* - E$B^ 0 <. Y 5. 1 
or 
(2) E$B^ - E$Bt_i = YE$B* - YE$Bj._J^ 
which is algebraically equivalent to: 
(3) E$B = yE$B* + (1 - Y)E$B 0 <. Y 1 1 
t t—1 
where: 
AE$B = the actual change in Euro-dollar borrowings between 
t-1 and t, 
E$B* = the desired level of Euro-dollar borrowings at t, 
E$B^ ^ = the actual level of Euro-dollar borrowings at t-1, 
Y = the fraction by which the banker is able to adjust to 
equilibrium in a single period. 
Changes in Euro-dollar borrowings are a function of desired 
levels of Euro-dollar borrowings, and to specify these desired levels 
a model of the individual bank must be developed. 
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A simplified balance sheet identity for an individual bank 
may be specified as: 
(4) R + G + L = DD + SD + CD + F + B + E$B 
where: 
R = reserves, 
G « government securities, 
L = loans, 
DD = net demand deposits, 
SD = time and savings deposits, 
CD » certificates of deposit, 
F = federal funds, 
B =" borrowings from the Federal Reserve, 
E$B = Euro-dollar borrowings. 
and: 
R, G, L, DD, SD, CD, B ^  0; F, E$B 1 0. 
If it is assumed that banks hold zero excess reserves, reserves may 
be expressed as: 
(5) R = r(DD) + e(E$B - E$B^) + s(SD + CD)^ 
where : 
E$By = the reserve free Euro-dollar borrowings base, 
r = the reserve requirement ratio on net demand deposits, 
s = the reserve requirement ratio on time and savings deposits, 
e " the marginal reserve requirement on Euro-dollar borrowings. 
^Thls reserve equation is applicable to the post-July 1969 
period and wl11 be used throughout the development of this theoreti­
cal model. 
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By substituting (5) into (4) and simplifying: 
(6) G + L = (1 - r)DD + (1 - 8)(SD + CD) + (1 - e)E$B 
+ eE$Bjj + F + B 
The banker Is assumed to manage his assets and liabilities 
in order to maximize the utility function, 
(7) U = U ( T T, S, A) 
where: 
ïï = profit, 
S « soundness, 
A = liquidity. 
PrpHt 
Profits are equal to total revenue minus total costs and 
total revenue may be expressed as : 
(8) TR = gG + pL + 6^ DD 
where: 
TR = total revenue, 
g = the interest rate on government securities, 
p = the Interest rate on loans, 
6^ = the service charge rate on demand deposits. 
Total costs may be written as; 
(9) TC = GgDD + tSD + cCD + fF + kB + bE$B + K 
where: 
TC = total costs, 
dg = the cost of servicing demand deposits, 
t = the interest rate paid on time and savings deposits, 
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c " the interest rate paid on certificates of deposit, 
f = the interest rate paid on federal funds. 
k = the interest rate paid on Federal Reserve borrowings 
b = the interest rate paid on Euro-dollar borrowings. 
K - fixed costs including the cost of servicing loans. 
By assuming that the cost of servicing demand deposits is 
equal to the service charge on demand deposits (i.e., 6^ = 62) 
profits can be expressed as: 
(10) TT = gG + pL - tSD - cCD - fF - kB - bE$B - K 
Liquidity 
The banker is concerned with liquidity because of his desire 
to meet obligations which will come due between the current period, 
t, and his planning horizon, t+h. These obligations include deposit 
withdrawals, redemption of maturing certificates of deposit, loan 
requests,^ repayment of borrowings from the Federal Reserve, repay­
ment of matured federal funds borrowings, and repayment of matured 
Euro-dollar borrowings. At time t the banker is certain about 
the portion of borrowings from the Federal Reserve, certificates 
of deposit, federal funds borrowings, and Euro-dollar borrowings 
which will come due between t and t+h. The banker must form subjec-
^The loan requests referred to in this model are those which 
the banker chooses to meet. For a discussion of the customer rela­
tionship and the banker's decision to deny or meet loan requests see: 
Donald R. Hodgeman, Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy (Univer­
sity of Illinois, 1963) pp. 154-58. Duane Harris, "Rationing Credit 
to Business, More than Interest Rates," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, Business Review, August 1970, pp. 3-14. Luckett, 
"Credit Standards and Tight Money." 
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tlve expectations concerning the levels of loan requests and deposit 
withdrawals during the planning horizon. Maturing obligations 
constitute uses of funds for the banker and are the source of his 
concern with liquidity. 
Sources of funds which are available to the banker include 
government security liquidation, the collection of matured loans, 
the sale of certificates of deposits, new borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve, new federal funds borrowings, increases in deposits, new 
Euro-dollar borrowings, and those reserves freed by deposit with­
drawals. If loan default is ignored, the banker is certain about 
the portion of his loan portfolio which will be repaid during the 
planning horizon. He must make subjective expectations about the 
levels of federal funds borrowings, deposits, certificates of deposit, 
borrowings from the Federal Reserve and Euro-dollar borrowings which 
will exist at t+h. The banker has some control over these levels 
but his expectations will be formed on the basis of various expected 
interest rates and regulations. For instance the difference between 
the Regulation Q ceiling rate on certificates of deposit and the 
secondary CD rate will affect the bankers expectations regarding CD 
issues between t and t+h, and thus the expected level of CD holdings 
at t+h. 
The definition of bank liquidity used here is based on the 
difference between sources and uses of funds. Liquidity is defined 
as follows : 
(11) Gj. - Aj^CDj. + EACD - + EAB - X F^ + EAF - X^(l-e)E$B^ 
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+ E(l-e)AE$B + - EAL - EXg(l-r)ADD + E(l-r)ADD 
- EXy(l-s)SD + E(l~s)ASD - Ao = 0 
which may be written as: 
(12) + E(ACD + AB + AF + (l-e)AE$B + (l-r)ADD 
+ (l-s)ASD - Xg(l-r)DD^ - Xy(l-s)SDt - AL] 
- X^CDt - XjBj. - XgF^ - X4(l-e)E$Bj. - Ao = 0 
where : 
E = the expected value operator, 
A = the change in the level of the indicated variable between 
t and t-Hi, 
X. = the proportion of certificate of deposit holdings at t 
which will be redeemed between t and t-Hi, 
X2 = the proportion of federal funds borrowings at t which 
will be repaid between t and t+h, 
Xg = the proportion of borrowings from the Federal Reserve 
at t which will be repaid between t and t+h, 
X^ = the proportion of Euro-dollar borrowings at t which 
will be repaid between t and t+h, 
X^ = the proportion of loans at t which will be collected 
between t and t+h, 
X, = the proportion of demand deposits at t which will be 
withdrawn between t and t+h, 
X_ - the proportion of time and savings deposits at t which 
will be withdrawn between t and t+h, 
a - the standard deviation of the distribution of [ACD + AB 
+ AF + (l-e)AE$B + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ASD - X,(l-r)DD 
- X^(l-e)SDj. - AL], 
A " the measure of liquidity. 
If we assume that the expectations in Equation (12) are 
distributed with known mean and standard deviation then A is the only 
unknown in (12). This is the number of standard deviations by which 
E[ACD + AB + AF + (l~e)AE$B + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ASD - Xg(l-r)DDj. 
- A^(l-e)SD^ - AL] may underestimate the actual level without caus­
ing the banker to be unable to meet his needs for liquid funds. 
Suppose it is known that a banker expects, from t to t+h, to 
issue $140 in new CDs, borrow $100 from the Federal Reserve, borrow 
$500 in federal funds, borrow $700 in the Euro-dollar market, accept 
$800 in demand deposits, accept $115 in time and savings deposits, 
and meet $750 worth of new loan demand. 
Further assume that, between t and t+h, 5 percent of his 
CD holdings at t will mature = .05), all of his borrowings from 
the Federal Reserve at t must be repaid = 1), all of his federal 
funds borrowing at t must be repaid ® 1), 60 percent of his 
Euro-dollar borrowings at t will mature (X^ = .60), and 5 percent of 
his loan portfolio at t will mature (X^ = .05). Suppose it is also 
known that the banker expects 30 percent of his demand deposits to 
be withdrawn between t and t+h and 3 percent of his savings and time 
deposits are expected to be withdrawn (X^ •= .30 and X^ = .03). 
If the standard deviation of the distribution of E[ACD + AB 
+ AF + (l-e)AE$B + (l-r)ADD + (l-s)ASD - X^(l-r)DD^ - Xy(l-s)SDj. 
- AL] were known, a measure of the banker's liquidity could be ob­
tained from his current portfolio (at t). The following values con­
stitute one possible example: 
Current portfolio Expected changes 
CD 1,000 X^ o .05 E(ACD) == -.05(1,000) + 150 = 50 
Fj. = 400 Xg = 1 E(AF) = -1(400) + 500 = 100 
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Current portfolio Expected changes 
B » 100 X3 = 1 E(AB) =• -1(100) + 100 = 0 
ESBf = 1,000 = .60 E(AE$B) " -.60(1,000) + 700 = 100 
L. = 5,000 E(A3) = .05 E(AL) = -.05(5,000) + 750 = 500 
DD. = 3,000 E(X6) = .30 E(ADD) « -.30(3,000) + 800 = -100 
SD^ - 500 E(Xy) = .03 E(ASD) = -.03(500) + 115 = 15 
In this example the solution of Equation (12) yields Ao «• $65. 
If we assume that 0 « $65 then A = 1. If the distribution is normally 
distributed the banker has adjusted his portfolio in a manner which 
assures him of being able to meet his liquidity needs 84 percent 
of the time. If the standard deviation of the distribution were 
$32.50, A would be two. In this case the banker would be assured 
of meeting his liquidity needs 98 percent of the time, given the 
assumption of a normal distribution. 
Soundness 
The concept of soundness is used as a measure of the bank's 
ability to withstand unexpected changes in its liabilities and un­
expected changes in the value of its assets. It is a measure of 
the bank's ability to meet its obligations to its customers in the 
event of forced liquidation due to unexpected events such as local 
or national economic contraction. 
The definition of soundness used here is derived from the 
Federal Reserve's Form for Analyzing Bank Capital which is used to 
evaluate the bank's capital adequacy under assumed conditions of dis­
tress. This definition is expressed as the difference between the 
realizable value of the bank's assets in assumed periods of 
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contraction and an assumed maximum decline in liabilities which would 
accompany swch a contraction. 
(13) St = Rj. + *20% + WjLj. ~ w^CDj. - w^SDj. - w^DD^ 
- Bt - Ft - E$Bc 
where : 
» the measure of soundness, 
W2 = the percentage of the current value of the bank's pre­
sent holdings of government securities which would be 
realizable under the assumed conditions of distress, 
Wg = the percentage of the current value of the bank's pre­
sent holdings of loans which would be realizable under 
the assumed conditions of distress, 
w^ =» the percentage by which the bank's current CD liabili­
ties might decline, through attrition, under the assumed 
conditions of distress, 
W5 « the percentage by which the bank's current time and 
savings deposits might decline under the assumed condi­
tions of distress, 
w^ = the percentage by which the bank's current demand de­
posits might decline under the assumed conditions of 
distress. 
Since R is a linear function of DD, SD + CD, and E$B - E$By, a weight 
(w^) can be defined so that: 
(14) w^R = Wgr(DD) + w^sSD + w^sCD + e(E$B - E$B^) 
and the substitution of (14) into (12) simplifies to: 
(15) S(. = W2G + W3L - Wg(l-r)DD - w^(l-s)SD 
- w^(l-s)CD - (l-e)E$B - eE$B^ - B - F 
which is the specification of soundness to be used in this study. 
Having specified a utility maximization model of bank behav­
ior in which Euro-dollar borrowings enter the utility function through 
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their effects on profits, soundness and liquidity the desired, or 
equilibrium, levels of Euro-dollar borrowings must now be derived. 
The bank is viewed as having five alternative methods of acquiring 
needed reserves; liquidation of government securities, selling 
certificates of deposit, purchasing federal funds, borrowing from 
the Federal Reserve, and borrowing Euro-dollars. 
The banker is assumed to have perfect knowledge with respect 
to his reserve needs, and it is assumed that these needs arise from 
increases in loan demand, withdrawals of demand deposits, and with­
drawals of time and savings deposits. Differential calculas is 
used to derive the variables which the banker considers relevant 
when faced with reserve needs and the assumed means of adjustment. 
changes in utility for a given change in any or all of the variables. 
The total derivative of the utility function in this model may be 
expressed as: 
The total derivative of the utility function describes the 
(16) du = ^iidTr+ 4-
oTi db oA 
Given that K is constant dir reduced to: 
(17) d" " 12*+ IrdL + lariSD + 
The total derivative of soundness is: 
(18) dS . llgdDD + lljdSD + llgdCD f 
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By assuming o constant E[ACD + AB + AF + (l-e)AE$B + (l-r)ADD 
+ (l-s)ASD - Xg(l-r)DD^ - Ay(l-s)SD^ - AL] constant, and the maturity 
structure of the banker's portfolio constant ^2, A3, and 
Aj constant) the total derivative of liquidity reduces to; 
(19) dA o ||dG + I^CD + ||iB + ||dF + 3§$BdE$B 
The partial derivatives of Equations (17), (18), and (19) 
may be evaluated using Equations (10), (15), (12). The results are; 
(20) dir = gdG + pdL - tdSD - cdCD - fdF - kdB - bdE$B 
(21) dS = w^dG + WgdL - w^(l-r)dDD - Wg(l-s)dSD - w^(l-s)dCD 
- (l-e)dE$B - edE$B^ - dB - dF 
(22) dA = §[dG + A^dL - A^dCD - AgdF - A^dB - A^dE$B] 
Substituting Equations (20), (21), and (22) Into the utility 
function. Equation (16), results in: 
(23) dU = ||-[gdG + pdL - tdSD - cdCD - fdF - kdB - bdE$B] 
+ g-glWgdG -f WgdL - Wg(l-r)dDD - W5(l-s)dSD 
- w^(l-s)dCD - (l-e)dE$B - edE$B^ - dB - dF] 
au 1 ,  
+ Ya + >5dL -• X.dCD - ÀgdP - ^ dB - A^dE$B] 
Factoring Equation (22) yields the total derivative of the utility 
function in the following form: 
(24) dU.dG[|^+gw2+E;]+dW|^+&3+EK] 
- dSD[|^ -f ||w5(l-s)] - dCD[|^ + ||w^(l-s) 
+ al " dDD[iyw6(l-r)] - dE$B[§;b + §§<l-e) 
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+ # - dF[H£ + II + f 1x2) 
- dB[|%k + li + IÏ 3*3] 
Desired levels of Euro-dollar borrowings, E$B*, are those 
levels which yield the banker maximum utility under the constraints 
imposed by the bank's accounting balance sheet. Thus the necessary 
(first order) condition for utility maximization under the conditions 
of the balance sheet identity is that dU = 0 for all variations which 
satisfy 
(25) dG + dL = (l-r)dDD + (l-s)dSD + (l-s)dCD 
+ (l-e)dE$B + edE$Bjj + dF + dB 
Solving Equation (25) for dE$B yields: 
(26) dE$B = + dL - (l-r)dDU - (l-s)dCD - edE$By 
— dF — dB] 
Substituting Equation (26) into Equation (24) imposes the condi­
tions of the balance sheet identity on the model and yields: 
(27) au . dG[|^ + aL[|^ +#3+# &X5] 
- <iSD[|^ + ||«5(l-s)] - dDD[||wj(l-r)] 
- + I? ^ t H- II + If ix3] 
- (i_e)we + dL - (l-r)dDD - (l-s)dSD - (l-s)dCD 
-dF-dBlt|^+||(l-., 
Factoring and simplifying Equation (27) results in : 
33 
(28) dU - dGl|^(g - + ||(»2-l) + Ix Î<1 -
+ dLr|ï<p - + |f(W3-l) + Ix i<X5 - -(1^)1 
- |t^ > ^ Ifa-e) (W3«, - i ^ 
- dCD[|^<c - Ijèïf^) + ||(l-s)(w4+l) + |j J 
3U,^ b . 9U 1_ ^4 
- - Th^ + 3Â ô(^2 - ÔTeT^ 
(Ï^ + E?(^3- C&] 
Equation (28) is the total derivative of the utility function 
under the conditions of the balance sheet identity. The first order 
conditions of utility maximization, or portfolio equilibrium, require 
that dU =• 0 for all variations In the independent variables and thus 
require that 
(29) i§(w2-i) + ÏA - TT;!)) = ° 
(30) Iwtp - 7i:;T) + l#(*3-i) + 1% - Ti;;! " ^ 
(31) >-»+#(l-:)(''5+l)-#i%^.G 
(32) - Ii(l-r)(w6+l) + E o " 0 
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(34) l7"-â^)-^t>2-Tï^)-o 
(35) 
and that 
IM be . 3U 1 ^^4 _ Q 
3ir (1-e) BA o (1-e) 
(36) i!<k - Ti;;)) +1#2 +1% ;<A3 - Tr;;!) - o 
The above first order conditions are the general equilibrium 
conditions for a bank's portfolio. The purpose of this paper is to 
determine the variables which the banker considers in making Euro­
dollar borrowings when faced with a need for reserves as a result of 
increased loan demand, withdrawal of time and savings deposits, or 
withdrawal of demand deposits under the restriction that his alterna­
tive sources of funds are limited to liquidation of government securi­
ties, selling certificates of deposit, purchasing Federal Funds, 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and borrowing Euro-dollars. 
When a banker is in need of reserves due to a demand deposit 
withdrawal he must choose among the combinations of sources of funds 
which are available to him. It is the purpose of this paper to 
derive the variables which the banker considers in determining his 
Euro-dollar borrowings. This may be done by deriving the equilibrium 
conditions implied by the model when the banker chooses among combina­
tions of Euro-dollar borrowings and other available sources of funds. 
These conditions are derived for the choices of Euro-dollar borrowings 
and liquidation of government securities, borrowing Euro-dollars and 
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selling certificates of deposit, Euro-dollar borrowings and purchases 
of Federal Funds, and borrowing Euro-dollars and borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve. 
If the banker experiences demand deposit withdrawals and 
uses Euro-dollar borrowings and government securities sales to regain 
portfolio equilibrium, the balance sheet identity (25) requires that 
(l-e)dE$B - dG = - (l-r)dDD. This returns him to portfolio equili­
brium with zero excess reserves. 
By using the total derivative of the utility function (24) 
and the necessary conditions of utility maximization a relationship 
among the variables can be derived under the assumption that Euro­
dollar borrowings and government security liquidation are the only 
available sources of funds. 
The total derivative of the utility function may be expressed 
as: 
(37) dU -
+ |^^4] - dDD[|^6(l-r) ] 
and since (l-e)dE$B - dG - - (l-r)dDD or dDD « - (l-e)dE$B - dG. 
(1-r) 
(38) dU . dG[|^ + 11^2 + E + §(l-e) 
+ •^4! + [(l-e)dE$B - dG] ] 
Equation 38 may be reduced to: 
(39) dU . dG[|%g + |§(w2_wa) + 1% - dE$B[|%b 
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+ ||(l-e) (l-w^) + §^^^4] 
The first order conditions require that 
(40) 
(41) §% + ||(l-e)(l-Wg) + If - 0 
so that 
i<"2-"6) +#7-1!^+ #(:-=) (l-"6) + i 
which implies that 
W3) |ïï(8-b) + ||1<W2-1) + ed-Wj)] + § . 0 
Under the assumption that Euro-dollar borrowings and sales 
of certificates of deposit are the only available sources of funds 
by which a banker may adjust to a demand deposit withdrawal he must 
make the adjustment such that (l-e)dE$B + (l-s)dCD = - (l-r)dDD. 
The total derivative of the utility function (24) now becomes: 
(44) dU - - dCD[|^ + ||w^(i-s) + |f-
- dE$B[|^ + If(l-e) + Ix - dDD[||w^(l-r)] 
Given that (l-e)dE$B + (l-s)dCD = - (l-r)dDD, Equation (44) now 
becomes : 
(45) dU - - dCD[|^ 4- ||w^(l-s) + 4^] 
.dE$B[|^+§(l-e)+|f^\] 
+ [(l-e)dE$B + (l-s)dCD][||wg]. 
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Equation (45) may be reduced to: 
(46) dU = - dCD[|fc -f ||(l-8) (w^-wg) + ^  
-dE$B[|^+§(l_e)(l_Wg) 
The first order conditions are: 
(47) Ifc + §a<l-s)(w4-W6) + E 0^1 " ° 
(48) +#(!-=) (1-^6) +EFA4-O 
Equations (47) and (48) make it possible to write 
(49) B:+li(l-")(W4-W6)+#;Al 
- 1!» + li(l-:)(l-wa) + 1%^  
which may be expressed as 
(50) l^(c-b) + |~[(w^-l) + e(l-wg) + s(w6-w^)] 
+ ll = 0 
If the banker is allowed to choose only between Federal Re­
serve borrowings and Euro-dollar borrowings when adjusting to demand 
deposit withdrawals he must make the portfolio adjustment so that 
(l-e)dE$B + dB = - (l-r)dDD. 
In this case the total derivative of the utility function 
is expressed as: 
(51) dU . - dBl|4 +§ + 1^1,,] - + i(l-a) 
^ SU 1, , 
+ - dDD[âgW^(l_r)]. 
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Substituting (l-e)dE$B + dB ® - (l-r)dDD into Equation (51) 
yields 
(52) dU - - + # + + #(l-e) 
+ Is §*4) + [(l-e)dESB + dB][||wjl. 
Equation (52) is reduced to; 
(53) dU - - dB[|^ + Ifd-Wg) + — - dE$B[|^ 
+ |%(l-e)(l-W6) + 1% 3*4] 
The first order conditions are: 
(54) l;k + li(l-W6) + 2*3 " * 
(55) ^ + ^ (l-e)(l-w^) + Ix ^^4 " ° 
which may be written as: 
(56) + n(i-«)(i-w^) + E 
Equation (56) may be formulated as: 
(57) If(k-b) + ||[e(l-w^)] + H ^(^3-^4) " ° 
If Euro-dollar borrowings and purchases of Federal Funds are 
the only sources of funds available to the banker, he must adjust to 
demand deposit withdrawals so that (l-e)dE$B + dF - (l-r)dDD. 
Under these conditions the total derivative of the utility 
function is: 
(58) dU = - dF(|S^ ^  II + 1^ - dE$B[|% + II(1-e) 
lï 0*4! -
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Equation (59) is derived by substituting - ^ •» dDD 
(1-r) 
into Equation (58) and simplifying: 
(59) dU - - dF[|&f + Ifd-wj) + If ^ 2' 
- ( 1 - 6 )  + 1 ;  
The first order conditions are: 
(60) + #(1^,) + |fix2-0 
(61) lî*" Hi (1-G) (1-"6)1 + Ia 0*4 - 0 
which may be expressed as: 
(62) If(f-b) +||te(l-Wg)] +|f = 0 
Equations (43), (50), (57), and (62) give the variables 
which the banker must consider in determining his behavior as a 
Euro-dollar borrower when faced with demand deposit withdrawals. 
He is viewed as choosing among combinations of Euro-dollar borrow­
ings, Federal Funds purchases, borrowings from the Federal Reserve, 
certificate of deposit sales, and Government Securities sales as 
sources of funds. 
The same technique is used to determine those variables 
which are of Interest to the banker in formulating his behavior as 
a Euro-dollar borrower when experiencing withdrawals of time and 
savings deposits. 
when the banker chooses a combination of government securities 
liquidation and Euro-dollar borrowings as sources of funds he must 
choose quantities which satisfy (l-e)dE$B - dG •= - (l-s)dSD. 
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By substitution and simplification the first order condi­
tions, under the constraints of the balance sheet identity, are 
derived to be: 
(63) ||[g - b - = 0 
If the banker chooses between Euro-dollars and certificates 
of deposit as alternative sources of funds, the balance sheet identity 
requires that (l-e)dE$B + (l-s)dCD = - (l-s)dSD. 
The first order conditions are 
(64) - b - + ^ [(w^-1) + e(l-w^) + s(w^-w^)] 
+ IA ' 0 
In choosing between Euro-dollar borrowings and borrowings 
from the Federal Reserve the banker's balance sheet identity requires 
that (l-e)dE$B + dB - - (l-s)dSD. 
With this constraint the first order conditions may be ex­
pressed as : 
- Trk-I + §[-(^-"5)1 + i ?<*4-X3) - 0 
If the banker responds to time and savings deposit with­
drawals by choosing between Euro-dollar borrowings and Federal Funds 
as sources of funds the balance sheet identity requires that 
(l-e)dE$B + dF - - (l-s)dSD. 
The first order conditions in this case reduce to: 
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Equations (63), (64), (65), and (66) Indicate the variables 
which the banker considers In re-equlllbratlng his portfolio when 
It has been shocked by a reduction In time and savings deposits. 
The variables Involved in the banker's decisions regarding 
his behavior as a Euro-dollar borrower will now be derived under the 
assumption that his need for reserves is a result of Increased loan 
demand. Die technique is the same as that used in Equations (37) 
through (66). 
If the banker chooses to make the necessary portfolio adjust­
ment by borrowing Euro-dollars and liquidating government securities 
the constraint implied by his balance sheet identity is that 
(l-e)dE$B - dG « dL. 
The first order conditions derived from Equation (23) may be 
expressed as : 
(67) |^[g-b-pel + ||[(Wi-l) + eCl-W])] + ~ ^(l-X^-X^e) = 0 
The balance sheet Identity constraint which applies when the 
banker uses Euro-dollar borrowings and certificate of deposit sales 
as the source of funds is (l-e)dE$B + (l-s)dCD ® dL. 
In this case the first order conditions are: 
(68) |^[c-b-p(e-s)] + ^(wy,-l) + 8(w^_w^) + e(l-W2)] 
âlî 1 
aÂ (^1-^4) + ^ 5(8-6)] = 0 
If the banker chooses to adjust his portfolio through Euro­
dollar borrowings and borrowings from the Federal Reserve the balance 
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sheet Identity constraint under which he must operate is (l-e)d£$B 
+ dB «" dL. 
From Equation (23) and the balance sheet constraint, the 
first order conditions result in: 
(69) |E[k-b-pe] + IfUd-Wj)] + ^(\-^3+^5e) - 0 
When the banker adjusts his portfolio by borrowing Euro­
dollars and purchasing Federal Funds his balance sheet identity re­
quires that (l-e)dE$B + dF = dL. 
The first order conditions in this case are expressed as: 
(70) |^[f~b-pe] +||[e(l-W3)3 + ^(\-^2+Se) " « 
The variables with which the banker must be concerned when 
determining his desired level of Euro-dollar borrowings are de­
rived in Equations (43), (50), (57), (62), (63), (64), (65), (66), 
(67), (68), (69), and (70). The variables are e, s, (g-b), (c-b), 
(k-b), (f-b), [g-b - , [c-b - (i_g)^ ] » [k - b - (i_g)], 
et 
[f-b - (i_s)]. [g-b-ep], [c-b-p(e~s)], [k-b-ep], [f-b-ep], 
M 
3Tr' as' 3A* 
These variables encompass the situation in which the banker 
needs reserves due to demand deposit withdrawals, time and savings 
deposit withdrawals, and increased loan demand when he chooses to 
adjust his portfolio with some combination of Euro-dollar borrow­
ings, Government Security liquidation, certificate of deposit sales, 
borrowings from the Federal Reserve, and purchases of Federal Funds. 
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Aigner and Bryan's Model of Short-Run Bank Behavior^ 
The bank behavior model presented by Aigner and Bryan is of 
particular interest due to its similarity to the model developed in 
this thesis. The two models are similar in that both use a utility 
maximization assumption with a balance sheet identity constraint. 
The models differ in that Aigner and Bryan specify an additive 
utility function while the form of the utility function used in 
the model of this thesis remains unspecified. The arguments sub­
sumed by the utility function presented by Bryan and Aigner are not 
explicitly defined while those of the utility function used in this 
thesis are. 
The Balance Sheet Identity 
Aigner and Bryan's basic balance sheet identity is: 
(71) + [-y^] + [-yg] + xg + + [-y^] 
= y4 + + ["X4] + [-X5] + [-xg] + y^ 
where: 
x^ a excess reserves, 
-y^ •=" pledged or collateralized investments, 
x^ ^ total investments less [-y^] or "other investments," 
x^ » loans to commercial banks, 
-y^ " other loans, 
y4 " demand deposits, 
y^ = savings deposits, 
^Aigner and Bryan, "Short Run Bank Behavior." 
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-x^ - CDs, 
-Xj " borrowings from the Fed». .eserve, 
-xg " borrowings from commercial banks, 
= capital accounts. 
Variables X]^ through Xg are viewed as short-run control vari­
ables while variables through yg are viewed as being uncontrollable 
in the short run. The balance sheet identity is rewritten as 
6 6 
(72) I Xi - I yi . 
1=1 1-1 
6 
Specifying that % y. = z yields the form of balance sheet 
1=1 
6 
identity used in the model (i.e., ^ Xj[t] « z[t]). 
1=1 
The Utility Function 
Aigner and Bryan argue that a bank attempts to adjust its 
portfolio in a manner which maximizes its returns from its short-run 
adjustment position. The utility derived from an asset (or dis­
utility derived from a liability) is viewed as having two components, 
the nominal rate of return and a subjective component. The nominal 
rate of return is the market yield while the subjective returns (or 
costs) reflect expected future costs or returns. Thus the subjec­
tive component subsumes Federal Reserve harrassment, liquidity con­
cerns based on the uncertainty of future deposit changes and loan 
demands, and risk over the portfolio adjustment. 
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Total returns are specified as: 
6 X, 
(73) R(t) "  I  i f  [f (u.) + r,(t)]du,} 
i-1 0 c 
where : 
R(t) " total returns, 
ft(Ui) = the subjective return (or cost) from the ith con­
trollable variable, 
rji^(t) " the nominal return (or cost) from the ith controllable 
variable. 
The Lagrangian equation to be maximized is 
6 
(74) R'(t) = R(t) + X[ ][ X (t) - z(t)], 
i-1 ^  
and the first order conditions are 
(7 
(75) f;(Xi) + ri(t) + A - 0 
6 
(76) 1 Xj^(t) - z(t) = 0 
i-1 
Since utility functions are not directly observable func­
tional forms, f^(x^) cannot be specified and optimal levels for 
[%^(t)] cannot be explicitly derived. Aigner and Bryan accomplish 
a qualitative analysis using the second order conditions under the 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility. The qualitative analysis 
concludes that optimal levels of controllable variables increase as 
their returns Increase and decrease as the returns on substitutes 
increase. 
An Evaluation of the Theoretical Model 
By specifying an additive utility function, Aigner and Bryan 
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fall to recognize the possibility that the marginal utilities of 
the control variable may not be independent of one another. That 
is f^(xj^) may be a function of through x^. Using the summation 
of the nominal rates plus the subjective rates for each variable as 
a measure of the total utility received from a given portfolio does 
not allow for the trade off between total nominal returns and the 
total effect on utility of the portfolios liquidity characteristics. 
The model presented in this thesis avoids this unrealistic analytical 
method. 
The Empirical Format 
Bryan and Âigner direct their empirical work toward the 
establishment of subjective return schedules (the f^'s) for the 
control variables (the x^'s). They argue that the equilibrating 
rate of return is functionally related to the level of the sum of 
the uncontrollable variables (z[t]). The composition of z(t) is 
not considered as a relevant variable. 
Bryan and Aigner test the hypothesis that there Is a subjec­
tive rate of return affecting bank adjustment decisions using a time 
series of particular control variables (x^[t]) and a time series of 
z(t). The series of z(t) is grouped into a set of r contiguous and 
exhaustive classifications. The model used to posit the proposition 
that the relationship between Xj^(t) and z(t) varies over the scale 
of z(t) is 
(77) x^(t) - 6q + Bj^x^(t) + 8pWr(t) 
or 
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E 
+ I BjW. (t) 
" j«l J J 
where ; 
Wj (t) • z(t) - Zj (t) if Zj(t) <_ z(t) £ 
and zero otherwise. 
Zj(t) is the lower boundary of the jth category of z(t) so 
that Wj(t) •» z(t) - Zj(t) if and only if z(t) lies in the jth cate­
gory. 
If the nominal rate of return on the controllable variable 
is the parameter which dominates adjustment decisions, one would 
expect through 3^ of Equation (7) to be equal to (not significantly 
different from) one another. Significant differences between the 
regression coefficients of Equation (7) would support the hypothesis 
that adjustments in the controllable variables depend on subjective 
rates of return which are related to the level of z(t). 
Equation (77) is empirically tested in a modified form. 
The nominal rates of return on the x^'s are Included as independent 
variables in order to capture the shifting of f^(xj^) over time. 
A proxy for anticipated deposit movements (A) is also included as 
a shift variable. The final equation is: 
(78) Xi(t) - + I 6jkWj(t) + Bp+i 1 rg(t) + rf(t) 
j"l 
+ Gr+3,i rj(t) + ®r+4,i &(%) + ^^(t) 
where 
rg = yield on three-month Treasury bills. 
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tg " yield on Federal Funds, 
r^ - Federal Reserve discount rate. 
The Empirical Results 
Although Euro-dollar borrowings are not included as a con­
trol variable in the model presented by Bryan and Aigner, the 
empirical results are presented to complete the presentation of 
their work. 
Bryan and Aigner use weekly observations of the balance 
sheet items from a sample of one bank. The regression coefficients, 
are estimated with the equations corrected for first order auto-
2 
correlation. The reported R 's are from equations not corrected 
for auto-correlation and the Durbin-Watson statistic is not re­
ported. 
The z(t) series is divided into six contiguous and exhaus­
tive categories. A test of significant differences among the regres­
sion coefficients of these six categories is not reported. The 
dependent variables used to test the final empirical 
equation (78) are excess reserves, investments, loans to banks, 
borrowings from Federal Reserve, and Federal Funds borrowings. 
(79) Excess reserves - 675.3 + 74.0 r - 9.5 r, - 35.2 r^ 
(2.78) (.30) (1.55) 
- 183.0 A - .21 wi - .19 #2 - .18 Wo 
(1.06) (2.33) (2.49) (2.49) 
- .16 wa - .15 Wr - .18 Wg 
(2.78) (2.78) (3.14) 
R^ ^ .09 
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(80) Investments ® 797.7 + 137.5 tg - 341.3 r. - 31.8 
(3.36) (6.73) (1.63 
+ 1,376.3 A - .11 Wi - .04 W2 + .03 wo 
(4.26) (1.38) (.65) (.52) 
+ .09 w, + .12 Wc + .20 W6 
(1.95) (2.85) (2.59) 
- .73 
(81) Loans to banks = -1,149.0 - 209.2 r- + 395.8 Tj + 59.6 
(4.91) (7.71) (1.94) 
- 1,368.1 A + .92 w, + .87 w + .84 w. 
(4.67) (6.75) (7.89) ^  (8.86) 
+ .80 Wa + .78 w + .77 
(9.79) (10.59) ^  (8.59) 
= .72 
(82) Borrowing from Fed = 158.1 + 13.6 rg - 57.1 rj + 15.5 r^ 
(1.39) (4.87) (1.98) 
+ 107.6 A - .04 w, - .06 w* - .05 wo 
(1.65) (1.11) (2.18) (2.25) 
- .05 wa - .05 Wc - .04 Wf 
(2.47) (2.49) (1.91) 
«• .20 
(83) Fed Funds borrowing « 196.7 + 30.8 tg + 14.2 r. - 7.2 r^ 
(1.90) (.73) (.60)^ 
- 231.6 A - .06 w, - .04 w„ - .04 w? 
(2.10) (1.19) (.96) (1.11) 
- .03 w, - .04 Wc - .04 Wz 
(.97) (1.26) (1.06) 
r^ m .08 
In the excess reserves equation all of the scale variables 
(w^ through Wg) are significant. In the Federal Funds borrowings 
equation none of these variables are significant. There are 18 
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significant scale variables in the five equations and 15 insignificant 
ones. Significance of the scale variables indicates that the optimal 
levels of the control variables are a function of the level of the 
summation of the uncontrolled variables. Even if all of the scale 
variables were significant, more information would be needed in order 
to accept or reject Bryan and Âigner's formulation of the subjective 
returns construct. 
Bryan and Aigner state that "on a priori grounds, if the 
subjective returns construct is credible, we would expect >3^, 
in any of the above models where through are the coeffi­
cients of the scale variables. The Indicated joint F test for 
significant differences among a subset of the regression coeffi­
cients is not presented, and the necessary statistics for performing 
this test are not reported. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Black's Econometric Study 
Stanley W. Black has published an econometric study of Euro­
dollar borrowings by New York banks^ In which reduced form equations 
are estimated from weekly data covering the period 1966-1968. 
Black states that "the literature on bank-liquidity adjust­
ments makes It clear that the main Instruments used In the week-to-
week management of liquidity positions of money-market banks are 
short-term U. S, Government obligations, borrowings of Federal Funds 
from other banks, borrowings from the Federal Reserve, and loans to 
dealers. More recently, certificates of deposits (CDs) and Euro­
dollar borrowings have been used both in liquidity management and as 
a source of more permanent lendable funds." Black's demand equation 
for Euro-dollar borrowings is 
(84) E$ = a + bCD + cRE + dRFF + eRTB 
where : 
E$ = Euro-dollar borrowings, 
CD = the quantity of CDs outstanding, 
RE =• the three-month rate on Euro-dollars, 
^Stanley W. Black. "An Econometric Study of Euro-Dollar 
Borrowings by New York Banks and the Rate of Interest on Euro-
Dollars," Journal of Finance, Volume XXVI (March, 1971), 83-88. 
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RFF = the Federal Funds rate, 
RTB = the rate on Treasury bills. 
and the expected signs on the coefficients are: 
b <0, c < 0, d > 0, e  > 0  
The level of CDs is entered with a negative sign as a proxy 
for the effects of Regulation Q on Euro-dollar borrowings. Black 
argues that "when the Interest rate on CDs hits the Regulation Q 
ceiling, supply side effects take over to reduce CD money available." 
It follows that the level of CDs should be used as a proxy only during 
periods when offer rates on CDs reach Regulation Q ceilings (or when 
secondary market CD rates exceed Regulation 0 ceilings) rather than 
being used throughout the sample period. 
Black's supply equation results from an assumption of interest 
elastic financial flows and a view of the Euro-dollar as a vehicle of 
exchange rate speculation. He also includes a proxy for the effects 
of the U. S. Balance of Payments Voluntary Foreign Credit Restriction 
Program. The supply equation Is: 
(85) ES = f + gRL + hRTB + iFL + kBPR + lUkEP, 
g > 0, h < 0, j < 0, k?, 1 < C 
where 
FL = the discount on the forward pound sterling vis-a-vis 
the U. S. dollar, 
BPR = the proxy for the effect of the U. S. Balance of Payments 
Voluntary Foreign Credit Restriction Program. 'BPR = 
ioo^k' ^here k is the percentage above the 1966 base that 
banks were allowed to extend loans under the program," 
UKBR = the U. K, Bank rate. 
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The reduced form equations which Black derives from his supply 
and demand equations are 
(86) %$ = ai + agCD + a^RFF + a^RTB + a^FL + a^BPR + a^UKBR 
a2 < 0, 33 >0, 34?, a^ <0, a^?, a? < 0 
(87) RE = bi + bgCD + bgRFF + b^RTB + b^FL + b^BPR + b^UKBR 
bg < 0, b] > 0, b4 > 0, bg > 0, bg?, by > 0 
Blacks' estimates of the reduced form equations yield 
(88) E$ = - 1413 - .09 CD + 131 RFF + 542 RTB - 57 FL 
(2.2) (2.7) (7.7) (1.8) 
- 91 flt_i + 26 t 
(3.0) (44.3) 
R^ = .96, se = 261, d = .66 
and 
(89) ARE = .200 + .168 RTB + .402 ARTE + .022 FL + .044 AFL 
(2.6) (2.8) (1.6) (2.2) 
+ .075 RFF - .0058 BPR - .0002 ACD + .415 AUKDR 
(2.2) (2.1) (2.1) (5.2) 
- .216 re 
(4.6)t-l 
R^ = .40, se = .168, d = 1.65 
Equation (89) is considerably different from Equation (87). 
A Koyck lag has been used and several independent variables have 
been entered as first differences and with lags for unspecified 
reasons. The tested Equation (89) seems to have evolved from the 
theoretical Equation (87) in some ad hoc and unexplained fashion. 
By setting all of the change variables equal to zero and 
algebraically solving for RE, Black derives the equilibrium form 
of Equation (87). 
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(90) RE = .93 + .77 RTB + .35 RPF + .10 FL - .027 BPR 
Black uses Equations (88) and (90) to derive the coefficients 
of the structural Equations (84 and 85). In order to solve for the 
coefficients of the structural equations he arbitrarily eliminates 
the time trend in Equations (88) and (90) and adds the coefficients 
of FL and FL^ ^ in Equation (88). The derived equations are 
DEMAND: E$ » .446 CD - 1480 RE + 650 RFF + 1681 RTB 
SUPPLY: E$ = 374 RE + 254 RTB - 185 FL + 50 BPR 
Evaluation of Black's Study 
Black has chosen to use interest rate levels as the indepen­
dent variables in his structural equations without theoretically 
deriving those variables. The theoretical model of this thesis 
yields interest rate differentials as independent variables. Using 
interest rate differentials implies that the banker is sensitive to 
relative costs of adjustment (In particular the cost of adjusting 
with Euro-dollar borrowings relative to the cost of other adjust­
ment instruments). Black's study views the banker as being sensi­
tive to the absolute cost of each adjustment instrument. 
Black uses the traditional indirect least squares technique to 
derive estimates of the coefficient of his structural equations. This 
technique requires that the system be exactly identified. Black's 
structural supply equation contains two endogenous variables and 
three exogenous variables, his structural demand equation contains 
two endogenous and four exogenous variables, and the system contains 
two endogenous and six exogenous variables. There are three variables 
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In the system which are not in the supply equation and two vari­
ables in the system which are not in the demand equation. Both 
structural equations in the system are overidentified (i.e., 
3 > 2-1 and 2 > 2-1). 
Black's use of indirect least squares estimation for an 
overidentified structural system is questionable. Black eliminated 
overidentifying restrictions from his reduced form equations in order 
to solve for the structural parameters. According to Goldberger 
"consistent estimates are still obtained, but this procedure is not 
recommended since it is arbitrary and since discarding information, 
as usual, results in loss of efficiency."^ 
The Model to be Tested 
Institutional considerations lead to the addition of variables 
to those derived in Chapter II. The effect which Regulation Q ceilings 
on CD offer rates (CQ) has on Euro-dollar borrowings was discussed in 
Chapter I. A proxy for this effect is included in the econometric 
equation to be tested. The proxy is the difference between secon­
dary market CD rates and the Regulation Q ceiling (c^ - Q) . 
When the secondary CD market rate exceeds Regulation Q ceil­
ings banks are effectively restricted from issuing CDs at the offer 
rate (CQ) and it is believed that banks rely more heavily on Euro­
dollar borrowings for portfolio adjustment purposes at these times. 
^Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). 
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It is expected that Euro-dollar borrowings are positively related 
to (Cg - Q). 
Not all of the reserve requirement regulations affecting 
Euro-dollar borrowings (Regulation D and M) discussed in Chapter I 
have been Incorporated in the theoretical model of Chapter II. In 
particular the reserve requirement Equation (4) of the theoretical 
model Is developed under the assumption that officer's checks issued 
in repayment of Euro-dollar borrowings are included in gross demand 
deposits. This assumption is valid only for the period after July, 
1969. To adjust for the bonus received from the clearing process 
prior to July, 1969, the 90 day Euro-dollar rate (b) and the Euro-dollar 
call rate (cb) have been adjusted by using the demand deposit reserve 
requirement ratio. It is specified that prior to July, 1969 
b = , .— and cb «= —— 
l+.llr 1+r 
where b' and cb' are the market rates and r is the demand deposit 
reserve requirement ratio. This adjustment yields the effective rate 
on the total reserves, including the clearing process bonus, acquired 
through Euro-dollar borrowings for the pre-July, 1969 period. For 
the post-July, 1969 period market rates are used. 
The level of the reserve requirement ratio on Euro-dollar bor­
rowings (e) is derived in the theoretical model and used in the empiri­
cal equation. The effects of the changes in the definition of the 
reserve free base are represented by dummy variables and D2. The 
dummy variable represents the reserve free base definition which 
was in effect from September, 1969 to January, 1971. The variable 
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D2 represents the reserve free base definition which has been in 
effect since January, 1971. 
It is expected that is positively related to Euro-dollar 
borrowings by United States banks. The exclusion of some portion of 
Euro-dollar borrowings from reserve requirements should lead to 
greater Euro-dollar borrowings than would be the case if all borrow­
ings were subject to reserve requirements. is also expected to be 
positively related to Euro-dollar borrowings since the January, 1971 
definition of the reserve free base incorporated an effective dotvn-
ward adjustment mechanism which was intended to encourage bankers to 
borrow quantities of Euro-dollars sufficient to maintain their reserve 
free bases. 
In the interest rate differentials of the theoretical model 
the 90 day Euro-dollar rate (b) is used in comparisons involving 90 
day money market instrument rates (g and Cq). The Euro-dollar call 
rate (cb) is used in comparisons involving shorter term money market 
instrument rates (f and k). 
A time trend is added to the empirical equation to account 
for the increase in the number of American banks and foreign branches 
of American banks involved in the Euro-dollar market which occurred 
through most of the sample period. The Euro-dollar market was 
fairly new at the beginning of the sample period (January, 1965) 
and increased recognition of and familiarity with the market through­
out the sample period lends support to the existence of a time 
trend. The time trend (T) is expected to be positively related 
to Euro-dollar borrowings. 
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Aside from institutional considerations the nature of the 
data leads to the exclusion of some variables derived from the theoret­
ical model. A high degree of multi-collinearity leads to the elimina­
tion of [g - b - [g - b - ep], [cq - b -
[cq - b - p(e-s), [k - cb - , [k - cb - ep], [f - cb - ep], 
gt 
and [f - cb ~ ]; while (g - b), (CQ - b), (k - cb) and (f - cb) 
are included. 
Linear regression is used in the empirical estimation and 
the above revisions yield the following equation for Euro-dollar 
demand by United States banks: 
(91) E$B = Uq + - b) + " b) + a^ff - cb) + a^(k - cb) 
+ «5(0^ - q) + a^e + oys + ogd^ + 
+ «iqt + (1 - a)e$b^_i + uj. 
«1» «2» ^3' "4» "6' "7' "8' "9' *10' ^  ° "6 ° 
In addition to estimating Equation (91) , an equation will be 
tested with the summation of the interest rate differentials sub­
stituted for the separately entered interest rate differentials. 
This is done to eliminate the effects of multi-collinearity among 
the interest rate differentials. 
(92) E$B = Og + a|X + «^(c^ - Q) + a^e + a^s + 
+ + a'T + (1 - X)E$B^_j^ + u^ 
where 
X - (g - b) + (CQ - b) + (f - cb) + (k - cb) 
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and 
«2' "5* "ô* "7 > 0 «3 < 0 
The coefficients on the interest rate differentials are ex­
pected to be positive. An increase in the differentials Implies a 
decrease in the cost of Ekiro-dollar borrowings relative to the cost 
of alternative adjustment instruments. 
The coefficient on the savings deposit reserve requirement 
ratio is expected to be positive. An increase in this ratio in­
creases the absolute size of the adjustment required to regain 
equilibrium following a given change in savings deposits. 
The coefficient on the Euro-dollar borrowings reserve re­
quirement ratio is expected to be negative. An increase in this ratio 
decreases the quantity of excess reserves gained through Euro-dollar 
borrowings and thus increase the per unit cost of these reserves. 
An increase in the Euro-dollar borrowings reserve requirement ratio 
increases the effective cost of using Euro-dollar borrowings as an 
adjustment mechanism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The Data 
The empirical examination spans the sample period from the 
four-week period ending January 27, 1965 through the four-week period 
ending April 28, 1971. This includes almost the entire period of 
significant Euro-dollar activity by United States banks and encom­
passes both the 1966 and the 1969 tight money periods. 
The data for each variable consist of 82 four-week-averages 
of weekly-averages of daily observations, except that four-week 
averages of weekly observations are used when dally observations 
are not available. Euro-dollar borrowings are denominated in mil­
lions of dollars, and all other variables are in percentages. A 
detailed description of the data and data sources is presented in 
Appendix A. 
In the case of Euro-dollar borrowings, four-week-averages 
are used because "net liabilities to own foreign branches" is not 
available. "Gross liabilities to own foreign branches" Is used, 
and it is believed that "due from own foreign branches" (the dif­
ference between gross and net liabilities to own foreign branches) 
is fairly stable over a four-week-averaging period, while it may 
fluctuate significantly on a dally or weekly-average basis. 
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The special Euro-dollar certificates issued to foreign 
branches of United States banks (as described in Chapter 1) by 
the UnitW States Treasury and the Import-Export Bank are added to 
"gross liabilities to own foreign branches" as a measure of Euro­
dollar borrowings. United States banks are allowed to include 
their foreign branches' holdings of these certificates in calculat­
ing the reserve free base for Euro-dollar borrowings. Parent banks 
are able to reduce their "liabilities to own foreign branches" by 
the amount of these certificate holdings without eroding their 
reserve free base. The quantity of these special certificate issues 
is therefore added to "gross liabilities to own foreign branches" in 
order to estimate the quantity of Euro-dollar borrowings which would 
occur if these certificates were not issued. 
Individual bank data would be best suited for testing the 
model of bank behavior developed in Chapter II of this thesis. 
Aggregate data are used because they are available and individual 
bank data are not. 
The Estimation Procedure 
Linear estimation is used throughout the empirical 
examination. The regression techniques employed are ordinary 
least squares, two stage least squares, and three stage least 
squares. The basic problems inherent in the data of this model 
are simultaneity bias and auto-correlation of the error terms. 
First order processes prove to be inadequate in removing 
auto-correlation in the error terms and two second order processes 
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are employed. "Rie generalized least squares (G.L.S.) procedure 
hypothesizes that: 
^t " Pl^t-1 + P2:t-2 + "t 
where: 
e = the residuals of the original equations, 
•» the first order auto-correlatlon coefficient, 
P2 " the second order auto-correlatlon coefficient, 
u = the random error term. 
In the generalized least squares procedure p^ and p^ are 
estimated using ordinary least squares and these estimates are used 
to transform the data of the original equation. 
In addition to the generalized least squares procedure, a 
scanning procedure Is used.^ In the scanning procedure p^ and Pg 
are allowed to vary from -1 to 1. That combination of p^ and Pg 
which minimizes the residual mean squares of the regression equation 
is chosen as the most efficient combination. 
Two and three stage least squares techniques are used to 
eliminate the effects of the simultaneous determination of Euro­
dollar borrowings and Euro-dollar rates. A supply function is 
specified in order to use these techniques. 
In specifying the supply function international financial 
flows are viewed as being highly interest elastic. The supply of 
Euro-dollar deposits is specified as a function of covered interest 
^C. Hildreth and Y. Y. Lu, "Demand Relations with Auto-
Correlated Disturbances," Michigan State University Technical 
Bulletin 276, 1960. 
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arbitrage between United States financial markets and the Euro-dollar 
market, British financial markets and the Euro-dollar market, and 
between German financial markets and the Euro-dollar market. The 
supply equation is 
(93) E$S® - Gq + g^^(g-b) + ggCUKt-b) + g^(Gi-B) + 6^(cg-cb) 
+ Bg(UKc-cb) + Bg(Gc-cb) + T + u^ 
where 
UKt = the United Kingdom 90-day Treasury bill rate plus 
the percentage premium (+) or discount (-) on the 
three-month forward pound sterling vis-a-vis the 
dollar. UKt-b is the difference between the 
proxy for all United Kingdom 90-day financial 
market rates and the 90-day Euro-dollar market 
rate covered for exchange risk from the viewpoint 
of the British investor. 
Gi = the 90-day German interbank loan rate plus the 
percentage premium or discount on the three-month 
forward German mark vis-a-vis the dollar. Gi-b is 
the covered difference between the proxy for all 
German domestic 90-day financial market rates and 
the 90-day Euro-dollar market rate. 
UKc = the rate on United Kingdom two-day local authority 
deposits. UKc-cb is the difference between the 
proxy for all United Kingdom domestic call market 
rates and the Euro-dollar call market rate. 
Gc " the Genmn interbank call money rate. Gc-cb is 
the difference between the proxy for all German 
call market rates and the Euro-dollar call market 
rate. 
E$S® " the supply of Euro-dollar deposits. 
All of the rate differentials of the supply function are ex­
pected to be inversely related to the supply of Euro-dollar deposits. 
Investors are viewed as preferring higher returns to lower returns 
and an increase in the rate differentials of the supply function 
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implies a decrease in the Euro-dollar rate relative to alternative 
rates. 
There are four endogenous variables E$S®, b, cb) in 
the simultaneous equation system under consideration. In order 
to derive reduced form equations for b and cb the demand and supply 
equations are divided into two call market equations and two 90-day 
equations. 
The call market supply and demand equations are: 
(94) E$Bc ® "q + + 028 + «gCCg-Q) + a^(f-cb) + a^Ck-cb) 
+ ogdi + aydg + ttgt + u; 
and 
(95) E$S^ - @0 + 3j^(cg-cb) + ggCGc-cb) + BgCUKc-cb) + g^T + u^ 
Assuming equilibrium, E$B = E$S, the reduced form equation for cb is: 
(96) cb = Yg + Y^Cg + Y2f + Ygk + Y^Gc + Y5UKC + YgQ 
where 
YO 
ya -
+ YyE + YgS + Y9D1 + y 10^2 + "t 
«0 " Go y s = -*3 
H + - 6^ - ^2 - h «4 + "5 
- *1 - ^2 - ^3 
a3 " 61 
- *3 
"4 + Og - 61 - - h Y6 " % + «5 - h~ ^ 2 - 63 
0, 
*1 
«4 "5 " ®1 ~ h " ^ 3 Y? " «4 + «5 
- *1 - ^2 
-^3 
Or 
Yg " ^2 
«4 + Gg - #2 ™ h - ^ 3 °'4 + «5 - 6^ - ^2 - 63 
- 62 
Yg -
°6 
^*4 + a, _ - h -63 «4 "5 ~ ®1 ~ h " ^3 
65 
«7 
10 *4 + «5 - gi - *2 - ^ 3 
The 90-day market supply and demand equations are: 
(97) e$bJ " «ô + + a^s + a^(Cg-q) + o^(g-b) + «^(c^-b) 
+ o^di + ap2 + «8^ + "t 
and 
(98) E$S® « 6^ + ei(g-b) + 6^(gi-b) + 6'(UKt-b) + 0^T + u^ 
The reduced form equation derived from Equations (97) and (98) is: 
(99) b - + vis + Y 2^0 Y3CI + Y^UKT + YJCCG-Q) 
+ Y^S + YJE + YI»! + y^2 * "T 
Y • "ô " *6 °3 
" «À + «5 -
- 4 '5 O4 + *5 - GÎ - 62 - 63 
f H - 61 °2 
*1 
" *4 + *5 - *1 - *2 
-4 '6 *4 + 05 - - 62 - ®3 
^ 1 "s "I 
»2 
" «À + «5 - 6i - 0i 
- 4 '7 " + «5 - *1 - ®2 - ^3 
- *2 "6 
*3 ™ *4 + *5 - GÎ - *2 
- 65 ^8 " «4 + «5 - -
^2 - ^3 
- 63 
*7 
- AJ + oj - E; - G; 
- *3 9 " 04 + 05 - E; - 62 - 63 
Ordinary least squares estimations of the reduced form equa-
(96 and 99) yield: 
cb " - 3.25 "S" .78c + . 02 f + 1.13k 4- .20Gc - .26UKC - .29Q 
+ .17e + .288 - 2.52d - a.lsdg 
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« .78 DW(d) - 2.09 
and 
b - - .69 + .57g - .21CQ + .5361 + .12UKt + .21(Cg-Q) 
+ .228 - .lOE + l.OOEi + .96D2 
- .96 DW(d) - .97 
Two stage least squares estimation of the aggregated supply 
function (93) yields: 
E$S® « - 958.66 - l,968.52(g-b) - 538.35(UKt-b) - 1,730.79(Gi-b) 
+ 131.13(c -cb) - 367.10(UKc-cb) + 276.19(Gc-cb) 
+ 88.46T + Uj. 
= .97 DW(T) » .734 
The demand equations will be tested using the stock adjust­
ment formulation (91 and 92) developed in Chapters II and III. These 
equations will also be tested in a static form, deleting the lagged 
dependent variable from the set of independent variables. This 
formulations results from the assumption that 100 percent adjust­
ment can be achieved in a single period, which implies that the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is zero (or that y 
of Equation (1) is one). 
Estimation of the Stock Adjustment Equation 
Estimation of the stock adjustment form of the demand for 
2 
Euvo-dollar borrowings by United States banks yields adjusted R s 
in excess of .99. The Durbin-Watson statistics range from 1.572 
to 2.027 (indicating that the second order processes are success-
TABLE 4.1® 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Corrections of Auto-Correlation of the Stock Adjustment Equation 
Dependent Variable - £$8^ 
Equation 
number and 
correction 
procedure Cwstent 8-b J
 
f-cb k-cb X c^-Q e s »1 »2 T R2 R2 01 02 D-W 
(1) -195.39 
(-.541) 
-229.16 
(-1.585) 
-2.98 
(-.025) 
91.47 
(.740) 
-115.59 
(-.907) 
361.13 
(2.508) 
-140.00 
(-1.817) 
16.37 
(.197) 
693.24 
(.849) 
1,160.20 
(.805) 
25.65 
(3.472) 
.78 
(13.614) 
.9948 .9940 1.622 
CI) G.L.S. -227.12 
(-.653) 
-279.71 
(-2.089) 
.95 
(.009) 
95,32 
(.877) 
-91.51 
(-.815) 
311.96 
(2.439) 
-123.00 
(-1.8021) 
-5.64 
(-.082) 
521.71 
(.711) 
700.35 
(.552) 
26.14 
(3.686) (13 
.79 
811) .221 -.373 2.027 
U) 
Scanning 
-186.94 
(-.634) 
-284.39 
(-2.177) 
4.95 
(.047) 
90.80 
(.853) 
-85.71 
(-.780) 
307.97 
(2.460) 
-119.33 
(1.752) 
-9.11 
(-.136) 
471.27 
(.646) 
625.12 
(.493) 
25.69 
(3.721) (14 
,80 
190) .200 -.400 2.004 
(2) -15.98 
(-.051) 
-40.05 
(-2.468) 
429.69 
(4.249) 
-124.17 
(-1.579) 
8.50 
(.112) 
383.62 
(.464) 
744.48 
(.502) 
23.90 
(3.520) (14 
.82 
738) 
.9943 .9937 1.644 
(2) G.L.S. 54.82 
(.179) 
-35.47 
(-2.371) 
386.73 
(3.823) 
-101.31 
(-1.385) 
-15.89 
(-.231) 
105.44 
(.136) 
220.77 
(.163) 
23.34 
(3.447) (14 
.84 
662) 
.209 -.294 1.981 
(2) 
Scanning 
55.32 
(.199) 
-35.93 
(-2.405) 
383.271 
(3.813) 
-100.87 
(-1.377) 
-17.44 
(-.257) 
94.387 
(.1214) 
210.627 
(.155) 
23.30 
(3.462) 
.84 
(14.76) 
.200 -.300 1.968 
on 
_ ^ 
^Kote: ^ «• coefficient of deteraioatioa* 
R • E Adjusted for degrees of freedora. 
D-W " Durbin-Watson statistic. 
*'t" values in parenth&sis lader coefficient estimates. 
TABLE 4.2" 
Two Stage Least Squares Estimates and Correction for Auto-Correlation of Stock Adjustment Equation 
Dependent Variable - E$Bj 
Equ£Cloa 
Bu^er end 
correctica . 
procedure Ccsstfist 8-b CQ-b f-cb k-cb X Cs-4 e s °1 D2 T E$B,.i R2 *2 D-W 
CI) %U42 
(.086) 
-156.67 
(-1.019) 
-18.25 
(-.145) 
114.97 
(.820) 
-260.87 
(-2.021) 
315.28 
(2.029) 
-142.46 
(-1.785) 
-17.17 
(-.203) 
539.81 
(.635) 
1,249.9 
(.824) 
27.30 
(3.549) 
.77 
(12.464) 
.9944 .9936 1.572 
(1) G.L.S. 
-55.46 
(-.155) 
-216.69 
(-1.491) 
-51.34 
(-.427) 
172.77 
(1.357) 
-259.85 
(-2.231) 
209.37 
(1.477) 
-113.10 
(-1.597) 
-32.45 
(-.438) 
3ir..23 
(.4X0) 
603.92 
(.459) 
28.36 
(3.693) 
.77 
(12.131) 
.247 -.325 1.948 
(2) -51,92 
(-.165) 
-89.03 
(-2.144) 
371.66 
(3.367) 
-130.21 
(-1.636) 
14.90 
C.194) 
378.27 
(.453) 
839.45 
(.559) 
23.51 
(3.43) 
.80 
(13.501) 
.9942 .9936 1.582 
(2) G.L.S. -2.69 
(-.ooy) 
-99,93 
(-2.552) 
320.46 
(2.987) 
-97.77 
(-1.361) 
-9.606 
(-.1379) 
-16.93 
(-.022) 
87.78 
(.066) 
24.20 
(3.509) 
.81 
(13.123) 
.249 -.307 2.017 
^See note to Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.3 
Three Stage Least Squares Estinates of the Stock Adjustment Equation 
Dependent Variable - E$B^ 
CO 
Equ&tioa 
qus6et g-b Cj-b f-cb k-cb 
"t-1 
(1) 
(2)  
-272.96 
(-.767) 
-390.04 
(-1,302) 
-188.97 -149.72 
(-1.295) (-1.300) 
91.43 
(.7175) 
-370.01 
(-3.059) 
344.99 
(2.4U) 
-194.44 
(-2.661) 
52.37 
(.658) 
120.23 1,987.04 
(1.534) (1.427) 
-161.42 462.22 -177.62 96.69 961.55 
(-4.097) (4.461) (-2.412) (1.331) (1.234) 
1,496.37 
(1.074) 
40.947 
(5.761) 
35.34 
(5.543) 
.60 
(10.770) 
.65 
(11.866) 
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2 
fui In correcting for auto-correlation). The results of the stock 
adjustment estimations are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. 
Ordinary least squares estimation of the stock adjustment 
equation (Table 4.1) yields only three significant^ variables; the 
proxy for Regulation Q (c^-Q), the time trend (T), and the lagged 
dependent variable (E^B^.i)• Although all of the significant vari­
ables and most (f-cb, E, S, D^, and Dg) of the other variables have 
coefficients of the anticipated sign, three of the rate differential 
variables carry negative coefficients, which are inconsistent with 
the theory of Chapter II. Federal funds constitute the closest 
substitute for Euro-dollar borrowings, and it is encouraging that 
the federal funds-Euro-dollar rate differential carries a coefficient 
of the anticipated sign. 
When the ordinary least squares estimation is corrected for 
auto-correlation, the reserve requirement on savings and time de­
posits remains insignificant but its coefficient becomes negative 
(a positive coefficient was anticipated). Correction for auto­
correlation yields a significant and negative coefficient on the 
government securltles-Euro-dollar rate differential. Using an index 
of rate differentials, rather than entering them individually, yields 
a significant interest rate effect with a negative coefficient. 
^It should be noted that the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
asymptotically biased toward two when used with ordinary least 
squares estimations which include lagged endogenous variables. 
Marc Nerlove, and Kenneth F. Wallis, "Use of the Durbin-Watson 
Statistic in Inappropriate Situations," Econometrica. Volume 
XXXIV (January, 1966), 235-238. 
All tests of significance are at the .05 level. 
70 
The inconsistencies between the theoretically anticipated 
and empirically estimated coefficients on the government securities— 
Euro-dollar differential, the CD-Euro-dollar rate differential, and 
the discount-Euro-dollar rate differential may be the result of 
the simultaneous determination of Euro-dollar borrowings and 
Euro-dollar rates. TWo and three stage least squares are used 
to eliminate the effects of simultanaeity bias. 
The two stage least squares results (Table 4.2) are very 
similar to those of ordinary least squares estimation. The federal 
funds-Euro-dollar rate differential remains insignificant and its 
coefficient maintains the theoretically anticipated sign. Two 
stage least squares estimation yields one rate differential (k-cb) 
which is significant with a negative coefficient, as did ordinary 
least squares estimation (g-b). 
Three stage least squares estimation adds the reserve re­
quirement on Euro-dollar borrowings to the list of significant 
variables with coefficients of the anticpated sign. The reserve 
requirement on time and savings deposits remains Insignificant 
but becomes positively signed (as theoretically anticipated). 
Three of the interest rate differential coefficients are negatively 
signed; however, two of them are insignificantly different from 
zero. 
Hie number of periods required for a given proportion of 
adjustment, and the average lag in adjustment, can be calculated 
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4 
from the adjustment coefficient (y = 1 - the coefficient of E$B^ ^). 
The three stage least squares estimate of the ajustment coefficient 
is .40, which implies that four and one-half periods (18 weeks) 
are required for 90 percent adjustment to be achieved. The 
iroplied-average lag in adjustment is one and one-half periods (six 
weeks). 
Estimation of the stock adjustment equation yields a dis­
appointing number of insignificant coefficients. The collinearity 
between the lagged dependent variable (E$B ) and the other in-
t—1 
dependent variables of the stock adjustment model results in a 
larger variance of the coefficient estimates than would exist if 
collinearity were not present. This larger variance results in 
lower levels of significance for the estimated coefficients. 
Elimination of the lagged dependent variable, or estimation of 
the static equation, is used to eliminate this collinearity. 
If the stock adjustment equation represents the proper 
specification of the demand for Euro-dollar borrowings by United 
States banks, then the static form of the equation is misspecified. 
This misspecification leads to relatively low standard errors asso­
ciated with biased coefficient estimates. 
^If p is the number of periods required to obtain k propor­
tion of total adjustment, then p - In(l-k) and the average lag in 
(1-Y) In(l-Y) 
adjustment is equal to y , Kenneth F.Wallis, "Some Recent 
Developments in Applied Econometrics: Dynamic Models and Simul­
taneous Equation Systems," Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 
VII (September, 1969), 771-96. 
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The three stage least squares estimate of the adjustment 
coefficient lends credulance to the hypothesis of rapid adjustment, 
and a priori information indicates that bankers adjust their Euro­
dollar borrowings very rapidly. The static form of the demand by 
United States banks for Euro-dollar borrowings equation is estimated 
with the above mentioned qualifications in mind. 
Estimation of the Static Equation 
Estimation of the static form of the demand for Euro-
2 dollar borrowings by United States banks yields adjusted R s 
ranging from .9752 to .9790. The Durbin-Watson statistics range 
from .824 to 1.866. The results of the estimations of the static 
equation are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
Ordinary least squares estimation (corrected for auto­
correlation) of the static form of the equation for Euro-dollar 
demand by United States banks yields significant coefficients with 
the anticipated signs for the federal funds-Euro-dollar rate dif­
ferential (f-cb), the proxy for the effect of Regulation Q (Cg-Q), 
the reserve requirement on Euro-dollar borrowings (E), the definition 
of the Euro-dollar reserve free base of September, 1969 (D^^), the 
definition of the Euro-dollar reserve free base of January, 1971 
(D2), and the time trend (T). The coefficients of the constant 
term, the government securities-Euro-dollar rate differential, the 
CD offer rate - Eurodollar rate differential, and the reserve re­
quirement on savings and time deposits are insignificant. The 
coefficient of the discount rate-Euro-dollar rate differential is 
lajle 4.4® 
0; iinary Least Squares Estimates and Corrections for Auto-Correlation of the Static Equation 
Dependent Variable - E$B^ 
Equstion 
nusaber and 
correction 
procedure Constant g-b 
•
f 
f-cb k-cb X Cg-q e s H d2 T r CI 02 D-W 
(1) -453.09 
(-.656) 
-240.26 
(-.871) 
-114.88 
(-.505) 
519.77 
(2.302) 
-566.35 
(-2.439) 
1,167.8 
(4.644) 
-359.54 
(-2.493) 
132.72 
(.840) 
4,392.8 
(2.980) 
4,753.8 
(1.723) 
102.92 
(11.932) 
.9809 .9782 .9137 
(1) G.L.S. -270.42 
(-.5634) 
-114.33 
(-.404) 
-268.04 
(-1.100) 
713.41 
(4.004) 
728.02 
(-3.947) 
859.33 
(3.862) 
-412.96 
(-4.263) 
65.76 
(.394) 
4.722.6 
(4.639) 
5,397.4 
(3.247) 
111.14 
(11.966) 
.739 -.391 1.662 
(2) -651.45 
(-1.066) 
-76.64 
(-2.508) 
1,715.9 
(16.737) 
-340.22 
(-2.216) 
250.99 
(1.705) 
4,157.0 
(2.659) 
3,788.4 
(1.296) 
102.17 
(12.508) 
.9774 .9752 1.0611 
(2) G.L.S. -421.36 
(-.8304) 
-41.23 
(-1.642) 
1.702.2 
(15.267) 
-394.01 
(-3.369) 
209.68 
(1.183) 
4,587.4 
(3.778) 
4,402.4 
(2.105) 
110.97 
(11.319) 
.575 -.253 1.701 
^See note to Table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.5® 
Tvo Stage Least Squares Estimates and Corrections for Auto-Correlation of the Static Equation 
Dependent Variable - E$B^ 
Equation 
number and 
correction 
procedure Constant g-b CQ-b f-cb k-cb X Cb-Q e s Dl °2 T Ol C2 D-W 
(1) -19.20 
(-.028) 
-198.83 
(-.7128) 
-169.86 
(-.752) 
327.12 
(1.294) 
-825.25 
(-3.871) 
1,041.9 
(3.968) 
-354.04 
(-2.500) 
79.98 
(.524) 
3,707.3 
(2.507) 
4,597.7 
(1.694) 
99.09 
(11.101) 
.9816 .9790 .824 
(1) G.L.S. -143.4 
(-.3407) 
-207.57 
(-.706) 
-281.70 
(-1.188) 
627.38 
(3.455) 
-1,112.0 
(-5.967) 
584.78 
(2.443) 
-357.28 
(-3.850) 
57.38 
(.345) 
3,686.9 
(3.726) 
4,820.7 
(3.017) 
102.63 
(10.501) 
.729 -.299 1.637 
(2) -659.98 
(-1.131) 
-270.22 
(-3.746) 
1,354.5 
(8.565) 
-341.82 
(-2.331) 
239.88 
(1.706) 
3,742.6 
(2.495) 
3,842.9 
(1.377) 
92.46 
(10.957) 
.9794 .9774 .990 
(2) G.L.S. -487.31 
(-1.044) 
-257.12 
(-3.613) 
1,276.3 
(7.650) 
-384.34 
(-3,539) 
218.50 
(1.289) 
4,070.5 
(3.569) 
4,391.1 
(2.271) 
99.58 
(9.921) 
.599 -.249 1.866 
^See note to Table 4.1, 
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significant and negatively signed. Two stage least squares 
estimation (Table 4.5) does not result in considerably different 
estimates. 
Evaluation of the Empirical Results 
Estimation of the static equation lends strong support to the 
theory developed in this thesis, under the assumption that bankers 
adjust their Euro-dollar borrowings rapidly. Figure 4.1 depicts 
the estimated and actual values of Euro-dollar borrowings, and the 
close fit throughout the sample period (including the great increases 
of 1969 and great decreases of 1970 and early 1971) is offered as 
evidence of the theoretical model's explanatory value. 
The estimated coefficients, with the exception of the coeffi­
cient of the discount rate-Euro-dollar rate differential, are con­
sistent with much of the existing literature dealing with the Euro­
dollar market. The insignificance of the 90-day interest rate differ­
entials (g-b and c^-b) is wholly consistent with the general concensus 
that bankers use Euro-dollar borrowings as a day-to-day money instru­
ment. The Insignificance of the CD offer rate-Euro-dollar rate 
differential can also be attributed to the fact that bankers were 
effectively excluded by Regulation Q from issuing CDs during much 
of the sample period. The insignificance of the reserve requirement 
on savings and t±m& deposits is attributable to the infrequency of 
changes in this requirement and the stability of savings and tine 
deposits. 
CHART 4.1 
Two Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Static Equation 
(Equation 1 of Table 4.5) 
Euro-dollar borrowings, 
(millions of dollars) 
14,000 
12,000 
10,000 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 
Euro-dollar borrowings, 
(millions of dollars) 
14,000 
actual 
fitted 
I  I  I  1 1  f  i l  1 1  I  I  I  
12,000 
10,000 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 
1-20 4-28 
1968 1969 1970 
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The relatively large coefficient of the proxy for the effect 
of Regulation Q on CD issues is consistent with the argument that 
banks resort to the Euro-dollar market when they are excluded from 
domestic sources of funds. 
The large positive coefficient associated with Indicates 
that the January, 1971 revisions of Regulations D and M did encourage 
bankers to maintain their reserve free Euro-dollar bases. It is 
not clear whether this action by bankers was in response to expected 
future Euro-dollar borrowings, which was the rationale appealed to 
in designing the January 1971 revisions, or to moral suasion by the 
Federal Reserve System, which is often cited as a cause by people 
within the System. The time trend of $111 million per four-week 
period is consistent with Black's^ estimate of $26 million per 
week (26 x 4 ® 104). 
The call market rate spread differentials are significant, 
which is consistent with the view of Euro-dollar borrowings as a 
short-term B»n^ market instrument. The positive coefficient of 
the federal funds-Euro-dollar rate differential is wholly consistent 
with economic theory, while the negative coefficient of the discount 
rate-Euro-dollar rate differential is not. This inconsistency may 
result from the inadequacies of the discount rate as a measure of 
the effective coat of borrowing from the Federal Reserve System.^  
^Stanley W. Black, "An Econometric Study." 
^Several models of member bank borrowimga from the Federal 
Be##rve include borrowing reluctance and anticipated Federal Reserve 
(footnote continued on following page) 
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The negative coefficient of the discount rate-Euro-dollar rate dif­
ferential may also be explained in part by the existence of influential 
moral suasion. Discount rate increases are often viewed as "subtle" 
announcements by the Federal Reserve System indicating their desire 
to tighten credit conditions. This announcement might encourage 
bankers to reduce their Euro-dollar borrowings, which would contribute 
to the inverse relationship between k-cb and Euro-dollar borrowings. 
(footnote continued from preceding page) 
harassment as variables in the estimation equation. These variables 
may be viewed as part of the effective cost of borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve System. Stephen M. Goldfield, and Edward J. Kane, 
"The Determinants of Member-bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study," 
Journal of Finance, Volume XXI (September, 1966), 499-514. Murray 
E. Polakoff, "Reluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and Member Bank 
Borrowing: A Suggested Integration," Journal of Finance, Volume 
XV (March, 1960), 1-18. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
Summary 
A description of the Euro-dollar market, with particular 
emphasis on United States bank borrowings, has been presented. A 
utility maximization model of the demand for Euro-dollar borrowings 
by United States banka has been derived with profits, liquidity, and 
soundness as arguments. Empirical examination of the model has sup­
ported its explanatory value, and the empirical results have been 
found to be consistent with existing literature. 
The empirical sample spans the period from early 1965 to 
April, 1971, and, unlike other published work on the subject, includes 
periods of significant changes in regulations governing United States 
bank behavior in the Euro-dollar market. It was found that an in­
crease of 1 absolute percentage point in the Euro-dollar borrowings 
marginal reserve requirement is associated with an average decline 
of $357 million in the level of Euro-dollar borrowings. An Increase 
of 1 absolute percentage point in the difference between the secondary 
CD rate and the Regulation Q ceiling was found to be associated with 
an increase of $584 million in Euro-dollar borrowings. The reserve 
free base of 1969 and its revision of 1971 were found to be signifi­
cantly associated with increased levels of Euro-dollar borrowings. 
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Policy Proposals 
The Federal Reserve System has control of two variables which 
are significantly associated with the level of Euro-dollar borrowings; 
the reserve requirement on Euro-dollar borrowings and the Regulation Q 
ceilings. In the past these tools have been used to counteract 
trends in Euro-dollar borrowings which were viewed as undesirable 
by the Federal Reserve. The potential of these instruments as posi­
tive policy tools has not been explored. 
Monetary policy has often been afflicted with an inconsistency 
between its effects on domestic goals and balance of payments goals 
when the need for easy domestic monetary policy has existed in con­
junction with balance of payments deficits. Monetary ease is gen­
erally associated with increasing income and increasing prices. As 
U. S. domestic income increases imports tend to be increased. As 
United States prices increase. United States goods become relatively 
more expensive in international markets and United States exports 
decline. Easy domestic monetary policy is typically viewed as in­
creasing the balance of trade deficit, and thereby increasing the 
basic balance of payments deficit (which includes the balance of 
trade and long-term capital flows). 
Operation twist of the early 1900s represents one attempt 
to use monetary policy as a viable tool during a period of unemploy­
ment and balance of payments deficits. Domestic investment was 
viewed as a function of long-term interest rates and international 
short-term capital flows were viewed as a function of short-term 
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interest rates. Operation twist was an attempt to maintain low 
long-term interest rates (to encourage domestic expansion) and allow 
short-term interest rates to rise (attracting short-term foreign 
capital). This policy was directed at the current account balance, 
not at the basic balance of payments. It was not an attempt to 
resolve the fundamental causes of the balance of payments deficit. 
Robert Mundell's analysis indicates that monetary policy 
should be reserved for international stabilization while fiscal 
policy should be used for dcsnestic stabilization.^ This analysis 
is concerned with the basic balance of payments ami the fundamental 
causes of international stability. 
United States bank activity in the Euro-dollar market, and 
the Federal Reserve System's ability to influence this activity, may 
offer a means of using easy domestic monetary policy without in­
creasing the risk of an exchange rate crisis. Although the Euro­
dollar market does not offer a means of avoiding easy domestic 
monetary policy's negative effects on the basic balance of payments, 
it does offer a means of avoiding increases in the official balance 
of payments deficit. 
Easy domestic monetary policy might be used to increase the 
total level of funds available to bankers, while Regulation Q and 
the reserve requirement on Euro-dollar borrowings are used to 
%«mdell, Robert A., "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," Readings in 
Money. National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Richard D. Irwin 
Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1965, pp. 519-523. 
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Influence the banker's choice of sources. If the Federal Reserve 
System were to use Regulation Q and the reserve requirement on 
Euro-dollar borrowings to encourage bankers to increase their Euro­
dollar borrowings during periods of easy domestic monetary policy 
and balance of payments deficits, the official balance of payments 
deficit might be inçroved. 
If Regulation Q ceilings and the reserve requirement on Euro­
dollar borrowings were reduced to encourage increased Euro-dollar 
borrowings, the Euro-dollar rate could be expected to increase in 
response to the increased demand for Euro-dollars. This increased 
Euro-dollar rate could be expected to attract funds from domestic 
markets. 
Whether or not increased Euro-dollar borrowings would im­
prove the official balance of payments deficit depends, in part, 
on the relative magnitudes of the increase in Euro-dollar borrowings 
and the increase in United States funds flowing to the Euro-dollar 
market. Furthermore, the magnitude of the flow of funds from various 
foreign domestic financial markets to the Euro-dollar market and the 
effect of these flows on foreign exchange rates would influence the 
efficiency of Euro-dollar borrowings as a balance of payments policy 
tool. The entire notion of Euro-dollar borrowings as a tool for in­
ternational stability depends on a system of relatively fixed exchange 
rates which are maintained by official monetary institutions. 
Much theoretical and empirical work is needed to evaluate 
the control of Euro-dollar borrowings as a positive approach to the 
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inconsistencies between easy monetary policy at home during periods 
characterized by balance of payments deficits. Given the relative 
inflexibility of United States fiscal policy, the analysis might 
be well worth the effort. 
83 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Clendenning E. Wayne. The Euro-dollar Market. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 
Einzlg, Paul. The Euro-dollar System. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, Inc., 1967. 
. The History of Foreign Exchange. London: Macmillan and 
Co. Ltd., 1962. 
Goldberger, Arthur S. Econometric Theory. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, InCsB 1964. 
Hodgeman, Donald R. Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy. 
Urbana: University of Illinois, 1963. 
Klndleberger, Charles P. International Economics. Homewood, 111.: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. 
Articles 
Aigner, Dennis J. and Bryan, William P. "A Model of Short Run Bank 
Behavior." The Quarterly Journal of Economics. LXXXV 
(February, 1971), 97-118. 
Aliber, Robert Z. "The Costs and Benefits of the U. S. Role as a 
Reserve Currency Country." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
LXXVIII (August, 1964), 442-56. 
Altman, Oscar L. "Euro-dollars: Some Further Comments." Interna­
tional Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. XII (March, 1965), 1-16. 
. "Recent Developments in Foreign Markets for Dollars and 
Other Currencies." International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. 
X (March, 1963), 48-96. 
. "What Does it Really Mean?—Euro-dollars." Hie Interna­
tional Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, Finance and 
Development. XIV (March, 1967), 9-16. 
84 
Black, Stanley W. "An Econometric Study of Euro-dollar Borrowings by 
New York Banks and the Rate of Interest on Euro-dollars." 
Journal of Finance, XXVI (March, 1971), 83-88. 
Elfizig, Paol. "Some Recent Changes in the Euro-dollar Market." 
Journal of Finance, XVÎIII (September, 1964), 443-49. 
"The Euro-Currency Business of Banks in London." Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, X (March, 1970), 31-49. 
"The Euro-dollar Market." Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Monthly 
Review, April, 1970, pp. 3-18. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Various issues. 
Goldfield, Stephen M. and Kane, Edward J. "The Determinants of 
Member-Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study." Journal of 
Finance, XXI (September, 1966), 499-514. 
Harris, Duane. "Rationing Credit to Business, More Than Interest 
Rates." Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Business 
Review, August, 1970, pp. 3-14. 
Kendershott, Patrie H. "The Structure of International Interest 
Rates: The U. S. Treasury Bill Rate and the Euro-dollar 
Deposit Rate." Journal of Finance, XXII (September, 1967), 
455-65. 
Hildreth C. and Lu, Y. Y. "Demand Relations with Auto-Correlated 
Disturbances." Michigan State University Technical Bulletin 
276, 1960. 
Klopstock, Fred H. "Ekiro-dollars in the Liquidity and Reserve 
Management of United States Banks." Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, Monthly Review, L (July, 1968), 130-38. 
. "The International Money Market: Structure, Scope, and 
Instruments." Journal of Finance, XX (May, 1965), 182-208. 
Kvasnicka, Joseph. "Euro-dollars—An Important Source of Funds 
for American Banks." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
Business Conditions, June, 1969, pp. 9-20. 
Little, Jane Sneddon. "The Euro-dollar Market: Its Nature and 
Impact." Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England 
Economic Review, May/June, 1969, pp. 2-31. 
Luckett, Dudley G. "Credit Standards and Tight Money." Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking. II (November, 1970), 420-34. 
85 
Mundell, Robert A. "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy for Internal and External Stability." Readings in 
Money, National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Edited 
by Warren L. Smith and Ronald L. Teigen. Homewood, 111.; 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965. 
Nerlove, Marc and Wallis, Kenneth F. "Use of the Durbin-Watson 
Statistic in Inappropriate Situations." Econometrica, 
XXXIV (January, 1966), 235-38. 
Polakoff, Murray E. "Reluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and Member 
Bank Borrowing: A Suggested Integration." Journal of Finance, 
XV (March, 1960), 1-18. 
Wallis, Kenneth F. "Some Recent Developments in Applied Econometrics: 
Dynamic Models and Simultaneous Equation Systems." Journal 
of Economic Literature, VII (September, 1969), 771-96. 
Other 
Brimmer, Andrew F. "Euro-dollar Flows and the Efficiency of U. S, 
Monetary Policy." Paper presented before a conference 
on Wall Street and the Economy 1969 at the New School for 
Social Research, New York, March 8, 1969. 
"Selected Interest and Exchange Rates for Major Countries and the 
U. S." U, S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, D. C. Various issues. 
Vander Wilt, Carl Eugene. "Member Bank Borrowings: A Microeconomic 
Approach." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Icya State University, 
1968. 
"Weekly Summary of Banking and Credit Measures." U. S. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D. C. 
Various issues. 
86 
ACKNOWLEDGEMEOTS 
This study was completed while I was a Doctoral Dissertation 
Fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. My gratitude is ex­
tended to the members of the Research Department and library staff 
for helpful advice and suggestions, and I am particularly indebted 
to Joseph Kvasnicka for his illuminating comments and Sandy Domuret 
for expert typing. 
Gratitude and respect are due to Professor Dudley Luckett, 
my major professor, who somehow managed to give me more than adequate 
guidance without limiting my independence. 
Thanks are also due to other members of my thesis committee, 
Professors Wayne Fuller, James Christian, Eugene Brady, and Rolf Theen. 
87 
appendix A 
SOURCES OF DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS 
(Alphabetically Listed) 
Daily observations of the 90-day Euro-dollar rate In the London 
market were received on tape from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Daily observations of the call market Euro-dollar rate were 
received on tape from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 
Weekly observations of tr-' range of CD offer rates at New York 
banks were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The midpoint of the range was used in the repressions of this 
thesis. 
Weekly average observations of the secondary CD market rate 
were obtained from the Federal Reserve System's "Weekly Summary 
of Banking and Credit Measures" (form H-9). 
Observations of the marginal reserve requirement on Euro-dollar 
borrowings are published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Aggregate observations of weekly averages of gross liabilities 
to own foreign branches are published in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
Observations of weekly averages of the federal funds rate were 
obtained from the Federal Reserve System's "Weekly Summary of 
Banking and Credit Measures'" (form H-9). 
Observations of weekly averages of the 90-day government securi­
ties rate were obtained from the Federal Reserve System's 
"Weekly Summary of Banking and Credit Measures" (form H-9). 
Weekly observations of the German interbank loan rate and the 
90-day forward exchange rate of the German mark vis-a-vis the 
U. S. dollar in the Frankfurt market were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve System's "Selected Interest and Exchange Rates 
for Major Countries and the U. S." (form 11-13). 
Weekly observations of the German interbank call rate were ob­
tained from the Federal Reserve System's "Selected Interest and 
Exchange Rates for Major Countries and the U. S." (form H-13). 
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k: Observations of the Federal Reserve discount rate are published 
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Q: Regulation Q ceilings are published in the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
rs Reserve requirements on demand deposits at Reserve City banks 
with deposits in excess of five million dollars were used. 
These rates are published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
s: Reserve requirements on time deposits in excess of five million 
dollars were used. These requirements are published in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
UKc: Weekly observations of the United Kingdom local authority two-
day deposit rate were obtained from the Federal Reserve System's 
"Selected Interest and Exchange Rates for Major Countries and 
the U. S." (form H-13). 
UKt: Weekly observations of the United Kingdom Treasury bill rate 
(adjusted to 90 days) and the three month forward exchange rate 
of the pound sterling vis-a-vis the dollar were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve System's "Selected Interest Rates and Exchange 
Rates for Major Countries and the U. S." (form H-13). 
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APPENDIX B 
REGULATIONS D AND M AS AMENDED EFFECTIVE 
April 1, 1971 
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
of the 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
RESERVES OF MEMBER BANKS 
REGULATION D 
(12 CFR 204) 
As amended effective February 12,1970 
Amy inquiry relatiiig to thb regalatioo should b* mddM#ed to l&e Federal 
Rewrye Bwk of A* Federal Rwerve District in whkh Am fiif liliy 
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REGULATION D 
(12 CFR 204) 
As amended effective Febniary 12,1970 
RESERVES OF MEMBER BANKS* 
SECTION 204.1—DEFINITIONS 
(a) Demand deposits. The term "demand depos­
its" includes all deposits except "time deposits" as 
defined below. 
(b) Time deposits. The term "time deposits" 
means "time certificates of deposit", "time depos­
its, open account", and "savings deposits", as de­
fined below; except that for the purposes of 
§ 204.5(c) "time deposits" shall have the meaning 
set forth therein. 
(c) Time certificates of deposit. The term "time 
certificate of deposit" means a deposit evidenced 
by a negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument 
which provides on its face that the amount of such 
deposit is payable to bearer or to any specified 
person or to his order: 
(1) On a certain date, specified in the instru­
ment, not less than 30 days after the date of de­
posit, or 
(2) At the expiration of a certain specified time 
not less than 30 days after the date of the instru­
ment, or 
(3) Upon notice in writing which is actually re­
quired to be given not less than 30 days before the 
date of repayment,' and 
(4) In all cases only upon presentation and sur­
render of the instrument. 
* The text corresponds to the Code of Federal Regula­
tions, Title 12, Chapter 11, Part 204; cited as 12 CFR 204. 
The words "this Part", as used herein, mean Regulation D. 
' A deposit with respect to which the bank merely re­
serves the right to require notice of not less than 30 days 
before any withdrawal is made is not a "time certificate of 
deposil". 
(d) Time deposits, open account The term 
"time deposit, open account" means a deposit, 
other than a "time certificate of deposit", with re­
spect to which there is in force a written contract 
with the depositor that neither the whole nor any 
part of such deposit may be withdrawn, by check 
or otherwise, prior to the date of maturity, which 
shall be not less than 30 days after the date of the 
deposit,° or prior to the expiration of the period 
of notice which must be given by the depositor in 
writing not less than 30 days in advance of with­
drawal.' 
(e) Savings deposits. The term "savings deposit" 
means a deposit— 
(I) which consists of funds deposited to the 
credit of one or more individuals, or of a corpora­
tion, association, or other organization operated 
primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, 
educational, fraternal, or other similar purposes 
and not operated for profit; * or in which the en-
" Deposits, such as Christmas club accounts and vaca­
tion club accounts, which are made under written con­
tracts providing that no withdrawal shall be made until a 
certain number of periodic deposits have been made dur­
ing a period of not less than 3 months constitute "time 
deposits, open account" even though some of the deposits 
are made within 30 days from the end of the period. 
A deposit with respect to which the bank merely re­
serves the right to require notice of not less than 30 days 
before any withdrawal is made is not a "time deposit, open 
account", within the meaning of the above definition. 
' Deposits in joint accounts of two or more individuals 
may be classified as savings deposits if they meet the other 
requirements of the above definition, but deposits of a 
partnership operated for profit may not be so classified. 
Deposits to the credit of an individual of funds in which 
any beneficial interest is held by a corporation, pariner-
ship, association, or other organization operated for profit 
or not operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, char­
itable, educational, fraternal, or other similar purposes 
may not be classified as savings deposits. 
§ 204.2 REGULATION D 
tire beneficial interest is held by one or more indi­
viduals or by such a corporation, association, or 
other organization; and 
(2) with respect to which the depositor is not 
required by the deposit contract but may at any 
time be required by the bank to give notice in 
writing of an intended withdrawal not less than 30 
days before such withdrawal is made " and which 
is not payable on a specified date or at the expira­
tion of a specified time after the date of deposit. 
(f) Deposits as including certain promissory 
notes and other obligations. For the purposes of 
this Part, the term "deposits" also includes a mem­
ber bank's liability on any promissory note, ac­
knowledgment of advance, due bill, or similar 
obligation (written or oral) that is issued or under­
taken by a member bank principally as a means 
of obtaining funds to be used in its banking busi­
ness, except any such obligation that: 
(1) is issued to (or undertaken with respect to) 
and held for the account of (i) a domestic banking 
office '' of another bank or (ii) an agency of the 
United States or the Government Development 
Bank for Puerto Rico; 
(2) evidences an indebtedness arising from a 
transfer of direct obligations of, or obligations that 
arc fully guaranteed as to principal and interest 
by, the United States or any agency thereof that 
the bank is obligated to repurchase; 
(3) has an original maturity of more than two 
years, is unsecured, and states expressly that it is 
subordinated to the claims of depositors; or 
(4) arises from a borrowing by a member bank 
from a dealer in securities, for one business day, 
of proceeds of a transfer of deposit credit in a 
Federal Reserve Bank (or other immediately avail­
able funds), commonly referred to as "Federal 
funds", received by such dealer on the date of the 
loan in connection with clearance of securities 
transactions. 
This paragraph shall not, however, affect (i) any 
instrument issued before June 27, 1966, (ii) any 
instrument that evidences an indebtedness arising 
from a transfer of assets under repurchase agree­
ment issued before July 25, 1969, or (iii) any in­
strument issued to a foreign office of another bank 
before June 27, 1969. 
(g) Gross demand deposits. The term "gross de­
mand deposits ' means the sum of all demand de-
The exorcise by ihe bank of its right to require such 
notice shall not cause the deposit to cease to be a savings 
ileposit. 
' Any bankiny otlice in any State of the United States 
or I he District of Columbia of a bank organized under 
domestic or foreign law. 
posits, including demand deposits to the credit of 
other banks, the United States, States, counties, 
school districts, and other governmental subdivi­
sions and municipalities, and all outstanding certi­
fied and officers' checks (including checks issued 
by the bank in payment of dividends and checks 
or drafts drawn by or on behalf of a foreign 
branch of a member bank on an account main­
tained by such a branch with a domestic office of 
the parent bank), and letters of credit and travel­
ers' checks sold for cash. 
(h) Cash items in process of collection. The 
term "cash items in process of collection" means; 
(1) Checks in process of collection, drawn on a 
bank, private bank, or any other banking institu­
tion, which are payable immediately upon presen­
tation in the United States, including checks with 
a Federal Reserve Bank in process of collection 
and checks on hand which will be presented for 
payment or forwarded for collection on the fol­
lowing business day; 
(2) Government checks and warrants drawn on 
the Treasurer of the United States which are in 
process of collection; 
(3) Such other items in process of collection, 
payable immediately upon presentation in the 
United States, as are customarily cleared or col­
lected by banks as cash items. 
Items handled as noncash collections may not 
be treated as "cash items in process of collection" 
within the meaning of this Part. 
(i) Net demand deposits. The term "net demand 
deposits" means gross demand deposits as defined 
in paragraph (g) of this section less the deductions 
allowed under the provisions of § 204,2(b). 
(j) Currency and coin. The term "currency and 
coin" means United States currency and coin 
owned and held by a member bank, including cur­
rency and coin in transit to or from a Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
SECTION 204.2—COMPUTATION OF 
RESERVES 
(a) Amounts of reserves to be maintained. (I) 
Every member bank shall maintain on deposit 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of its district an 
actual net balance equal to 3 per cent of its time 
deposits, plus 7 per cent of its net demand depos­
its if it is not located in a reserve city or 10 per 
cent of its net demand deposits if it is located in 
a reserve city, or such different percentages of its 
time deposits and net demand deposits as the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
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tem, pursuant to and within the limitations con­
tained in section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act, 
may prescribe from time to time in § 204.5 (the 
Supplement to this Part) : Provided, That a mem­
ber bank's currency and coin shall be counted as 
reserves in determining compliance with such re­
quirements to such extent as the Board of Gov­
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, pursuant to 
section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act, may per­
mit from time to time in § 204.5. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subpara­
graph (I) of this paragraph, a member bank lo­
cated in a reserve city may hold and maintain the 
reserve balances which are in effect for member 
banks not located in reserve cities if, upon appli­
cation to the Board of Governors, the Board 
grants permission for the holding and maintaining 
of such lower reserve balances after consideration 
of all factors relating to the character of such 
bank's business, including, but not limited to, the 
amount of such member bank's total assets, the 
amount of its total deposits, the amount of its 
total demand deposits, the amount of its demand 
deposits owing to banks, the nature of its depos­
itors and borrowers, the rate of activity of its 
demand deposits, its geographical location within 
the city, and its competitive position with relation 
to other banks in the city. Any such permission 
shall be subject to revocation by the Board at any 
time in the light of changed circumstances, and 
all such grants of permission may be subject to 
annual review by the Board. 
(3) For the purposes of this Part, a member 
bank shall be considered to be in a reserve city if 
the head office or any branch thereof is located in 
a reserve city. 
(b) Deductions allowed in computing reserves. 
In determining the reserve balances required un­
der the terms of this Part, member banks may 
deduct from the amount of their gross demand 
deposits the amounts of balances subject to im­
mediate withdrawal due from other banks and 
cash items in process of collection as defined in 
§ 204.1(h). Balances "due from other banks" do 
not include balances due from Federal Reserve 
Banks, balances (payable in dollars or otherwise) 
due from foreign banks or branches thereof 
wherever located, or balances due from foreign 
branches of domestic banks." 
" A member bank exercising fiduciary powers may not 
include in balances "due from other banks" amounts of 
trust funds deposited with other banks and due to it as 
trustee or other fiduciary. If trust funds are deposited by 
(c) Availability of cash items as reserve. Cash 
items forwarded to a Federal Reserve Bank for 
collection and credit cannot be counted as part of 
the minimum reserve balance to be carried by a 
member bank with its Federal Reserve Bank until 
the expiration of such time as may be specified in 
the appropriate time schedule referred to in Part 
210 of this chapter. If a member bank draws 
against items before such time, the draft will be 
charged against its reserve balance if such balance 
be sufficient in amount to pay it; but any result­
ing impairment of reserve balances will be subject 
to the penalties provided by law and by this Part: 
Provided, however. That the Federal Reserve Bank 
may, in its discretion, refuse at any time to permit 
the withdrawal or other use of credit given in its 
reserve account for any item for which the Fed­
eral Reserve Bank has not received payment in 
actually and finally collected funds. 
(d) Reserves against trust funds. A member 
bank exercising trust powers need not maintain 
reserves against trust funds which it keeps prop­
erly segregated as trust funds and apart from its 
general assets or which it deposits in another insti­
tution to the credit of itself as trustee or other 
fiduciary. If, however, such funds are mingled 
with the general assets of the bank, a deposit lia­
bility thereby arises against which reserves must 
be maintained. 
(e) Continuance of "time deposit" status. A de­
posit which at the time of deposit was a "deposit 
evidenced by a time certificate of deposit", "time 
deposit, open account", or "savings deposit" con­
tinues to be a "time deposit" until maturity or the 
expiration of the period of notice of withdrawal, 
although it has become payable within 30 days. 
After the date of maturity of any time deposit, 
such deposit is a demand deposit. After the expi­
ration of the period of notice given with respect 
to the repayment of any savings deposit or other 
time deposit, such deposit is a demand deposit, 
except that, if the owner of such deposit advise 
the bank in writing that the deposit will not be 
withdrawn pursuant to such notice or that the 
deposit will thereafter again be subject to the con­
tract or requirements applicable to such deposit, 
the deposit will again constitute a savings deposit 
or other time deposit, as the case may be, after 
the trust department of a member bank in its commercial 
or savings department and are then redeposited in another 
bank subject to immediate withdrawal they may be in­
cluded by the member bank in balances "due from other 
banks", subject to the provisions of § 204.2(b). 
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the date upon which such advice is received by 
the bank. 
SECTION 204.3—DEFICIENCIES IN 
RESERVES 
(a) Computation of deficiencies. (1) Reserve re­
quirements of all member banks shall be deter­
mined on the basis of average daily net deposit 
balances and average daily currency and coin cov­
ering 7-day computation periods which shall end 
at the close of business on Wednesday of each 
week. 
(2) In determining whether a member bank has 
maintained a reserve balance that is in excess of 
or less than its required reserve balance for any 
computation period: 
(i) The required reserve balance of such bank 
shall be based upon the average daily net deposit 
balances held by the member bank at the close of 
business each day during the second computation 
period prior to the computation period for which 
the computation is made. 
(ii) The reserve balance of such bank shall con­
sist of the average daily balance with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of its District held by the member 
bank at the close of businesss of each day during 
the computation period for which the computation 
is made and the average daily currency and coin 
held by the member bank at ihe close of business 
each day during the second computation period 
prior to the computation period for which the 
computation is made. 
(3) Any excess or deficiency in a member 
bank's required reserve balance for any computa­
tion period, determined as provided in subpara­
graph (2) above, will be carried forward to the 
next following computation period to the extent 
that such excess or deficiency does not exceed 2 
per cent of such required reserves, except that any 
portion of such excess or deficiency not offset in 
the next period may not be carried forward to 
additional computation periods. 
(b) Penalties. (I) Deficiencies in reserve bal­
ances remaining after the application of subpara­
graph (3) of paragraph (a) above will be subject 
to penalties, assessed monthly on the basis of aver­
age daily deficiencies during each of the compu­
tation periods ending in the preceding calendar 
month. 
(2) Any such penalty will be assessed at a rate 
of 2 per cent per annum above the lowest rate 
applicable to borrowings by each member bank 
from its Federal Reserve Bank on the first day 
of the calendar month in which the deficiencies 
occurred. 
(c) Notice to directors of banks deficient in re­
serves. Whenever it shall appear that a member 
bank is not paying due regard to the maintenance 
of its reserves, the Federal Reserve Bank shall 
address a letter to each director of such bank call­
ing attention to the situation and advising him of 
the requirements of the law and of this Part re­
garding the maintenance of reserves. 
(d) Continued deficiencies. If, after the notice 
provided for in paragraph (c) of this section has 
been given, it shall appear that the member bank 
is continuing its failure to pay due regard to the 
maintenance of its reserves, the Federal Reserve 
Bank shall report such fact to the Board of Gov­
ernors of the Federal Reserve System with a rec­
ommendation as to whether or not the Board 
should: 
(1) In the case of a national bank, direct the 
Comptroller of the Currency to bring suit to for­
feit the charter of suth national bank pursuant to 
section 2 of the Federal Reserve Act (38 Stat. 252; 
12 u s e. 501a); or 
(2) In the case of a State member bank, insti­
tute proceedings to require such bank to surrender 
its stock in the Federal Reserve Bank and to for­
feit all rights and privileges of membership pur­
suant to section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act (46 
Stat. 251; 12 U S.C. 327); or 
(3) In either case, take such other action as the 
Federal Reserve Bank may recommend or the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem may consider advisable. 
(SECTION 204.5—SUPPLEMENT, contain­
ing reserve percentages and use of vault cash in 
meeting reserve requirements, is printed sepa­
rately.) 
95 
REGULATION D STATUTORY APPENDIX 
STATUTORY APPENDIX 
Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act provides 
in part as follows; 
(a) The Board is authorized for the purposes of 
this section to define the terms used in this section, 
to determine what shall be deemed a payment of 
interest, to determine what types of obligations, 
whether issued directly by a member bank or in­
directly by an affiliate of a member bank or by 
other means, shall be deemed a deposit, and to 
prescribe such regulations as it may deem neces­
sary to effectuate the purposes of this section and 
to prevent evasions thereof. 
(b) Every member bank shall maintain reserves 
against its deposits in such ratios as shall be deter­
mined by the affirmative vote of not less than four 
members of the Board within the following limita­
tions; 
(1) In the case of any member bank in a re­
serve city, the minimum reserve ratio for any de­
mand deposit shall be not less than 10 per centum 
and not more than 22 per centum, except that the 
Board, either in individual cases or by regulation, 
on such basis as it may deem reasonable and 
appropriate in view of the character of business 
transacted by such bank, may make applicable 
the reserve ratios prescribed for banks not in re­
serve cities. 
(2) In the case of any member bank not in a 
reserve city, the minimum reserve ratio for any 
demand deposit shall be not less than 7 per 
centum and not more than 14 per centum. 
(3) In the case of any deposit other than a de­
mand deposit, the minimum reserve ratio shall be 
not less than 3 per centum and not more than 10 
per centum. 
The Board may, however, prescribe any reserve 
ratio, not more than 22 per centum, with respect 
to any indebtedness of a member bank that arises 
out of a transaction in the ordinary course of its 
banking business with respect to either funds re­
ceived [from] or credit extended by such bank to 
a bank organized under the law of a foreign coun­
try or a dependency or insular possession of the 
United States. 
(c) Reserves held by any member bank to meet 
the requirements imposed pursuant to subsection 
(b) of this section shall be in the form of— 
(1) balances maintained for such purposes by 
such bank in the Federal Reserve bank of which 
it is a member, and 
(2) the currency and coin held by such bank, 
or such part thereof as the Board may by regula­
tion prescribe. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec. 461.] 
• • « 
(f) The required balance carried by a member 
bank with a Federal Reserve bank may, under the 
regulations and subject to such penalties as may 
be prescribed by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, be checked against and 
withdrawn by such member bank for the purpose 
of meeting existing liabilities. 
(LF.S.C., title 12, sec. 464.] 
(g) In estimating the reserve balances required 
by this Act, member banks may deduct from the 
amount to their gross demand deposits the amounts 
of balances due from other banks (except Federal 
Reserve banks and foreign banks) and cash items 
in process of collection payable jmmediately upon 
presentation in the United States, within the mean­
ing of these terms as defined by the Board of Gov­
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec. 465.] 
Section 11 of the Federal Reserve Act provides 
in part as follows; 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System shall be authorized and empowered; 
(c) To suspend for a period not exceeding thirty 
days, and from time to time to renew such suspen­
sions for periods not exceeding fifteen days, any 
reserve requirements specified in this Act. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec. 248(c).] 
* $ * 
(e) To add to the number of cities classified as 
reserve cities under existing law in which national 
banking associations are subject to the reserve re­
quirements set forth in section [nineteen] of this 
Act; or to reclassify existing reserve cities or to 
terminate their designation as such. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec. 248(e).] 
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As amended effective February 12,1970 
SECTION 204.5—SUPPLEMENT 
(a) Reserve percentages. Pursuant to the provi­
sions of section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act and 
§ 204.2(a) and subject to paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this section, the Board of Governors of the Fed­
eral Reserve System hereby prescribes the follow­
ing reserve balances which each member bank of 
the Federal Reserve System is required to main­
tain on deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank of 
its district: 
(I) If not in a reserve city— 
(1) 3 per cent of (a) its savings deposits and (b) 
its time deposits, open account, that constitute de­
posits of individuals, such as Christmas club ac­
counts and vacation club accounts, that are made 
under written contracts providing that no with­
drawal shall be made until a certain number of 
periodic deposits have been made during a period 
of not less than 3 months; plus 
(ii) 3 per cent of its other time deposits up to 
$5 million, plus 6 per cent of such deposits in ex­
cess of $5 million; plus 
(iii) 12'/i per cent of its net demand deposits 
up to $5 million, plus 13 per cent of such deposits 
in excess of $5 million. 
(2) If in a reserve city (except as to any bank 
located in such a city which is permitted by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem, pursuant to § 204.2(a)(2), to maintain the 
reserves specified in subparagraph (I) of this para­
graph)— 
(i) 3 per cent of (a) its savings deposits and (b) 
its time deposits, open account, that constitute de­
posits of individuals, such as Christmas club ac­
counts and vacation club accounts, that are made 
under written contracts providing that no with­
drawal shall be made until a certain number of 
periodic deposits have been made during a period 
of not less than 3 months; plus 
(ii) 3 per cent of its other time deposits up to 
$5 million, plus 6 per cent of such deposits in ex­
cess of $5 million; plus 
(iii) 17 per cent of its net demand deposits up 
to $5 million, plus 11 Vi per cent of such deposits 
in excess of $5 million. 
(b) Currency and coin. The amount of a mem­
ber bank's currency and coin shall be counted as 
reserves in determining compliance with the re­
serve requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. 
(c) Reserve percentages against certain deposits 
by foreign banking offices. Deposits represented 
by promissory notes, acknowledgments of ad­
vance, due bills, or similar obligations described 
in § 204.1 (f) to foreign offices of other banks,® or 
institutions the time deposits of which are exempt 
from the rate limitations of Regulation Q pursu­
ant to § 217.3(g) thereof, shall not be subject to 
paragraph (a) of this section or to § 204.3(a)(1) 
and (2); but during each week of the four-week 
period beginning October 16, 1969, and during 
each week of each successive four-week ("mainte­
nance") period, a member bank shall maintain 
with the Reserve Bank of its district a daily aver­
age balance equal to 10 per cent of the daily aver­
age amount of such deposits during the four-week 
("computation") period ending on the Wednesday 
fifteen days before the beginning of the mainte­
nance period; except that only 3 per cent need be 
so maintained against such deposits which are 
time deposits ° aggregating not more than 4 per cent 
of such member bank's daily average deposits sub­
ject to paragraph (a) of this section during the 
computation period. An excess or deficiency in 
reserves in any week of a maintenance period un­
der this pargraph shall be subject to § 204.3(a)(3), 
as if computed under § 204.3(a)(2), and deficien­
cies under this paragraph shall be subject to 
§ 204.3(b) 
" I.e., offices of other banks not covered by § 204.1(f)(1). 
" For the purposes of this paragraph, "lime deposits" 
means any deposit having a maturity of one day or more. 
'"The term "computation period" in § 204.3(a)(3) and 
(b) shall, for this purpose, be deemed to refer to each 
week of a maintenance period under this paragraph. 
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ISSUED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
PART RESERVES OF MEMBER 
BANKS 
RESERVES AGAINST EURODOLLAR 
BORROWINGS 
1. Effective January 7, 1971, section 204.5 
(c) is amended to read as follows; 
SECTION 204.5 RESERVE 
REQUIREMENTS 
# » * 
(c) Reserve percentages against certain 
deposits by foreign banking offices. Deposits 
represented by promissory notes, acknowledg­
ments of advance, due bills, or similar obliga­
tions described in section 204.1(f) to foreign 
offices of other banks,® or institutions the time 
deposits of which are exempt from the rate 
limitations of Regulation Q pursuant to section 
217.3(g) thereof, shall not be subject to para­
graph (a) of this section or to section 204.3 
(a)(1) and (2)% but during each week of the 
four-week period beginning October 16, 1969, 
and during each week of each successive four-
week ("maintenance") period, a member bank 
shall maintain with the Reserve Bank of its 
district a daily average balance equal to 20 per 
cent of the amount by which the daily average 
amount of such deposits during the four-week 
("computation") period ending on the Wednes­
day fifteen days before the beginning of the 
maintenance period exceeds the lesser of (i) 
3 per cent of such member bank's daily aver­
age deposits subject to paragraph (a) of this 
section during the current computation period 
or during the computation period ending No­
vember 25, 1970, whichever is greater, or (ii) 
the lowest corresponding daily average total 
for any computation period beginning on or 
after December 24, 1970. An excess or defi­
ciency in reserves in any week of a maintenance 
period under this paragraph shall be subject to 
section 204.3(a)(3), as if computed under 
section 204.3(a)(2), and deficiencies under 
this paragraph shall be subject to section 204.3 
(b).« 
* * * * *  
2a. These amendments are issued pursuant 
to the authority granted to the Board of Gov­
ernors by section 19 of the Federal Reserve 
Any banking office located outside the States of 
the United States and the District of Columbia of 
bank organized under domestic or foreign law. 
" The term "computation period" in section 204.3 
(a)(3) and (b) shall, for this purpose, be deemed to 
refer to each week of a maintenance period under 
this paragraph. 
Act to set reserve ratios (12 U.S.C. 461) and 
by sections 25 and 9 of that Act to regulate 
foreign branches of member banks (12 U.S.C. 
601 and 321). The principal change is to 
raise from 10 to 20 per cent the reserve ratio 
applicable to a member bank's Eurodollar bor­
rowings to the extent they exceed a specified 
reserve-free base. This change becomes effec­
tive as to maintenance periods beginning Janu­
ary 7, 1971, as to reserve computation periods 
ending December 23, 1970. To prevent the 
higher marginal reserve requirement from hav­
ing the effect of penalizing banks that during 
the computation period ending November 25, 
1970, had Eurodollar borrowings above their 
reserve-free bases, the higher marginal reserve 
requirement will apply to borrowings above the 
higher of (a) the minimum base of 3 per cent 
of deposits, or (b) the average level of bor­
rowings in the computation period ending 
November 25, 1970. 
b. The second major change applies an 
automatic downward adjustment feature to the 
minimum reserve-free bases applicable to Euro­
dollar borrowings. Such à feature is presently 
operative under Regulation M with respect to 
historical reserve-free bases. The effect of this 
amendment is to eliminate the reserve-free 
minimum base to the extent a bank elects not 
to make use of it. This change becomes effec­
tive as to reserve computation periods begin­
ning December 24, 1970. 
c. The final change is technical. It provides, 
under Regulation D, a reserve-free mmimum 
base with respect to reserve requirements 
against member bank borrowings from foreign 
banking offices. This change is designed to con­
form the approach of reserve requirements 
applicable to Eurodollar borrowings under 
Regulation D with the approach under Regula­
tion M, which relates to Eurodollar borrowings 
by domestic offices from their foreign branches. 
This change becomes effective as to mainte­
nance periods beginning January 7, 1971, as to 
reserve computation periods ending December 
23, 1970. 
d. There was no notice and public partici­
pation with respect to these amendments, and 
in some respects the effective date was deferred 
for less than the 30 days referred to in section 
553(d) of Title 5, United States Code. Ihe 
Board found that following such procedures 
with respect to these amendments would be 
contrary to the public interest and serve no 
i scful purpose. 
CGO 2.5M 1970 
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f^L re&f 
Any inquiry relating to this regulation should be addressed to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of the Federal Reserve district in which the inquiry arises. 
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REGULATION M 
(12 CFR 213) 
As amended effeclivc January 7, 1971 
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL BANKS * 
SECTION 213.1—AUTHORITY AND SCOPE ' 
Pursuant to authority conferred upon it by 
section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act (the 
"Act"), as amended (12 U.S.C. 601-604a), the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem (the "Board") prescribes the following regu­
lations relating to (a) foreign branches of national 
banks, (b) the acquisition and holding of stock in 
foreign banks by national banks, and (c) loans or 
extensions of credit to or for the account of such 
foreign banks by national banks.-
SECTION 213.2—DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this Part— 
(a) "Foreign branch" means any branch es­
tablished by a national bank pursuant to section 
25 of the Act. 
(b) "Foreign country" or "country" means 
any foreign nation or colony, dependency, or 
possession thereof, any overseas territory, depen­
dency, or insular possession of the United States, 
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(c) "Foreign bank" means a bank organized 
under the law of a foreign country and not en­
gaged, directly or indirectly, in any activity in the 
United States except as, in the judgment of the 
Board, shall be incidental to the international or 
foreign business of such foreign bank. 
* This text corresponds to the Code of Federal Regula­
tions, Title 12, Chapter II, Part 213, cited as 12 CFR 
213. The words "this Part," as used herein, mean Regula­
tion M. 
' Insofar as provisions of Federal law are concerned, 
the provisions of this Part apply to State member banks 
of the Federal Reserve System as well as to national 
hanks. 
^ The subject matter of this Part is in addition to that 
contained in 12 CFR Part 211 (Reg. K). 
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SECTION 213.3—FOREIGN BRANCHES 
(a) EstabUsfeing foreign branches. A foreign 
branch may be established with prior Board per­
mission. If a national bank has established a 
branch in a foreign country, it may, unless other­
wise advised by the Board, establish other 
branches in that country after thirty days' notice 
to the Board with respect to each such branch. 
(b) Further powers of foreign branches. In 
addition to its other powers, a foreign branch may, 
subject to §§ 213.3(c) and 213.6 and so far as 
usual in connection with the transaction of the 
business of banking in the places where it shall 
transact business: 
(1) Guarantee customers' debts or otherwise 
agree for their benefit to make payments on the 
occurrence of readily ascertainable events,® if the 
guarantee or agreement specifies its maximum 
monetary liability thereunder; but, except to the 
extent secured with respect thereto, no national 
bank may have such liabilities outstanding (i) in 
an aggregate amount exceeding 50 per cent of its 
capital and surplus or (ii) for any customer in 
excess of the amount by which 10 per cent of its 
capital and surplus exceeds the aggregate of such 
customer's "obligations" to it which are subject 
to any limitation under section 5200 of the Re­
vised Statutes (12 U.S.C 84); 
(2) Accept drafts oi bills of exchange drawn 
upon it, which shall be treated as "commercial 
drafts or bills" for the purposes of paragraphs 
(c), (d), and (e) of § 203.1 of Part 203 (Reg. 
C); 
(3) Acquire and hold securities (including 
certificates or other evidences of ownership or 
participation) of the central bank, clearing 
houses, governmental entities, and development 
banks of the country in which it is located, unless 
after such an acquisition the aggregate amount 
invested by the branch in such securities (exclu­
sive of securities held as required by the law of 
that country or as authorized under section 5136 
of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 24)) would 
exceed one per cent of its total deposits on the 
preceding year-end call report date (oi on the 
' Including, but not limited to, such types of events as 
nonpayment of taxes, rentals, customs duties, or costs of 
iransport and Joss or nonconformance of shipping docu­
ments. 
date of such acquisition in the case of a newly 
established branch which has not so reported); 
(4) Underwrite, distribute, buy, and sell obli­
gations of the national government of the coun­
try in which it is located, * but fto bank may hold, 
or be under commitment with respect to, obli­
gations of such a government as a result of 
underwriting, dealing in, or purchasing for its 
own account in an aggregate amount exceeding 
10 per cent of its capital and surplus; 
(5) Take liens or other encumbrances on for­
eign real estate in connection with its extensions 
of credit, whether or not of first priority and 
whether or not such real estate is improved or has 
been appraised, and without regard to the ma­
turity or amount limitations or amortization re­
quirements of section 24 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 
371); 
(6) Extend credit to an executive officer of the 
branch in an amount not to exceed $50,000 or 
its equivalent in order to finance the acquisition 
or construction of living quarters to be used as 
his residence abroad, provided each such credit 
extension is promptly reported to its home office; 
(7) Pay to any officer or employee of the 
branch a greater rate of interest OP deposits than 
that paid to other depositors on similar deposits 
with the branch. 
(c) Limitations. Nothing in § 213.3(b) shall 
authorize a foreign branch to engage in the gen­
eral business of producing, distributing, buying, 
or selling goods, wares, or merchandise or, except 
as permitted by § 213.3(b) (4), to engage or partic­
ipate, directly or indirectly, in the business of 
underwriting, selling, or distributing securities. 
(d) Suspending operations during dis(url>ed 
conditions. The officer in charge of a foreign 
branch may suspend its operations during dis­
turbed conditions which, in his judgment, make 
conduct of such operations impracticable; but 
every effort shall be made before and during such 
suspension to serve its depositors and customers. 
Full information concerning any such suspension 
shall be promptly reported to the branch's home 
office, which shall immediately send a copy 
thereof to the Board through the Federal Reserve 
Bank of its district. 
* including obligations issued by any agency or instru­
mentality, and supported by the full faith and credit, of 
such government. 
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SECTION 213.4—ACQUISITION AND 
HOLDING OF STOCK IN FOREIGN BANKS 
(a) General. With the prior consent of the 
Board, and subject to the provisions of section 25 
of the Act and this Part, a national bank may 
acquire and hold directly or indirectly ° the stock 
or other evidences of ownership in one or more 
foreign banks; Provided, That the aggregate 
amount invested directly or indirectly (other than 
through a corporation operating under section 25 
of the Act or organized under section 25(a) of the 
Act) in the stock or other evidences of ownership 
of all foreign banks, taken together with invest­
ments by the national bank in the shares of corp­
orations operating under section 25 of the Act 
or organized under section 25(a) of the Act, shall 
not exceed 25 per cent of the national bank's 
capital and surplus. Nothing contained in this 
Part shall prevent the acquisition and holding of 
stock or other evidences of ownership in a foreign 
bank where such acquisition is necessary to pre­
vent a loss upon a debt previously contracted in 
good faith; but such stock or other evidences of 
ownership shall be disposed of within twelve 
months from the date of acquisition unless such 
time is extended by the Board. 
(b) Limitations. Stock or other evidences of 
ownership in a foreign bank shall be disposed of 
as promptly as practicable if (I) such bank should 
engage in the business of underwriting, selling, or 
distributing securities in the United States or (2) 
the national bank is advised by the Board that its 
holding is inappropriate under section 25 of the 
Act or this Part. The terms "stock", "shares", 
and "evidences of ownership" in this section in­
clude any right to acquire stock, shares, or evi­
dences of ownership, except (hat prior Board 
consent is not required for the acquisition and 
exercise of stock rights in lieu of dividends 
which are declared on shares already held by a 
national bank and which do not result in an in­
crease in percentage ownership of the foreign 
bank. 
(c) Required information. A national bank ap­
plying for the consent of the Board to acquire 
and hold stock or other evidences of ownership 
' However, prior consent of the Board is not required 
hereunder for indirect acquisitions in the stock of foreign 
banks made pursuant to the general consent provisions of 
§ 211.8 of Part 211 (Reg. K). 
in a foreign bank pursuant to this section shall 
furnish full information concerning such foreign 
bank including (unless previously furnished); (I) 
the cost, number, and class of shares to be ac­
quired, and the proposed carrying value of such 
shares on the books of the national bank; (2) 
recent balance sheet and income statement of the 
foreign bank; (3) brief description of the foreign 
bank's business (including full information con­
cerning any direct or indirect business transacted 
in the United States); (4) lists of directors and 
principal officers (with address and principal busi­
ness affiliation of each) and of all shareholders 
known to the issuing bank holding 10 per cent 
or more of any class of the foreign bank's stock 
or other evidences of ownership, and the amount 
held by each; and (5) information concerning the 
rights and privileges of the various classes of 
shares outstanding. 
(d) Reports. A national bank shall immediately 
inform the Board through the Federal Reserve 
Bank of its district with respect to any acquisition 
or disposition of stock in a foreign bank including 
the cost and number of shares acquired pursuant 
to this section. 
SECTION 213.5—LOANS OR .EXTENSIONS 
OF CREDIT TO FOREIGN BANKS 
A national bank which holds directly or indi­
rectly stock or other evidences of ownership in 
a foreign bank may make loans or extensions of 
credit to or foi the account of such foreign bank 
without regard to the provisions of section 23A 
of the Act (12 u s e. 371c). 
SECTION 213.6—CONDITIONS 
(a) The continued or prospective exercise of 
any power under this Part shall be subject to any 
notice interpreting or applying it that a national 
bank may receive from the Board, and such bank 
shall immediately comply therewith. 
(b) The Board may from time to time re­
quire a national bank to make reports at such time 
and in such form as the Board may prescribe re­
garding the exercise of any power hereunder and 
to submit information regarding compliance with 
this Part. 
" Whether through a corporation operating under sec­
tion 2.5 of the Act or organized under section 25(a) of 
the Act, or otherwise. 
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SECTION 213.7—RESERVES AGAINST 
FOREIGN BRANCH DEPOSITS 
(a) Transactions with parent bank. During each 
week of the four-week period beginning October 
16, 1969, and during each week of each successive 
four-week ("maintenance") period, a member 
bank having one or more foreign branches shall 
maintain with the Reserve Bank of its district, as 
a reserve against its foreign branch deposits, a 
daily average balance equal to 20 per cent of the 
amount by which the daily average total of 
(1) net balances due from its domestic offices 
to such branches, and 
(2) assets (including participations) held by 
such branches which were acquired from its 
domestic offices,' 
during the four-week ("computation") period 
ending on the Wednesday fifteen days before the 
beginning of the maintenance period, exceeds the 
greater of 
(i) the corresponding daily average total " for 
the computation period ending November 25, 
1970, or the lowest corresponding daily average 
total for any computation period beginning after 
that date, whichever amount is the lesser, or 
(ii) 3 per cent of the member bank's daily 
average deposits subject to § 204.5(a) of this 
chapter (Regulation D) during the current com­
putation period, or, if the bank has had a foreign 
branch in operation for more than 90 days, the 
lowest corresponding daily average total for any 
computation period beginning on or after Decem­
ber 24, 1970, whichever amount is the lesser: 
'Excluding (1) assets so held on June 26, 1969, repre­
senting credit extended to persons not residents of the 
United States and (2) credit extended or renewed by a 
domestic oOice after June 26, 1969, to persons not resi­
dents of the United States to the extent such credit was 
not extended in order to replace credit outstanding on 
that date which was paid prior to its original maturity 
(see definition of United States resident in footnote 9). 
" Excluding assets representing credit extended to per­
sons not residents of the United States. 
Provided, That the applicable base computed 
under (i) or (ii) shall be reduced by the daily 
average amount of any deposits of the member 
bank subject to § 204.5(c) of this chapter (Regu­
lation D) during the computation period. 
(b) Credit extended to United States residents. 
During each week of the four-week period be­
ginning October 16, 1969, and during each week 
of each successive four-week maintenance period, 
a member bank having one or more foreign 
branches shall maintain with the Reserve Bank of 
its district, as a reserve against its foreign branch 
deposits, a daily average balance equal to 20 per 
cent of the amount by which daily average credit 
outstanding from such branches to United States 
residents ° (other than assets acquired and net 
balances due from its domestic offices), during the 
four-week computation period ending on Wednes­
day fifteen days before the beginning of the main­
tenance period, exceeds the corresponding daily 
average total during the four-week period ending 
on November 25, 1970: Provided, That this para­
graph does not apply to credit extended ( 1 ) by a 
foreign branch which at no time during the com­
putation period had credit outstanding to United 
States residents exceeding $5 million, (2) to 
enable the borrower to comply with requirements 
of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments, De­
partment of Commerce,'" or (3) under binding 
commitments entered into before December 1, 
1970. 
" (a) Any individual residing (at the time the credit is 
extended) in any State of the United States or the Dis­
trict of Columbia; (b) any corporation, partnership, 
association or other entity organized therein ("domestic 
corporation"); and (c) any branch or office located 
therein of any other entity wherever organized. Credit 
extended to a foreign branch, office, subsidiary, affiliate or 
other foreign establishment ("foreign affiliate") controlled 
by one or more such domestic corporations will not be 
deemed to be credit extended to a United States resident 
if the proceeds will be used in its foreign business or that 
of other foreign affiliates of the controlling domestic cor-
poration(s). 
The branch may in good faith rely on the borrower's 
certification that the funds will be so used. 
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Section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act provides 
in part as follows; 
SEC. 25. Any national banking association 
possessing a capital and surplus of $1,000,000 or 
more may file application with the Board of Gov­
ernors of the Federal Reserve System for permis­
sion to exercise, upon such conditions and under 
such regulations as may be prescribed by the said 
board, the following powers: 
First. To establish branches in foreign coun­
tries or dependencies or insular possessions of the 
United States for the furtherance of the foreign 
commerce of the United States, and to act if re­
quired to do so as fiscal agents of the United 
States. 
Third, To acquire and hold, directly or indi­
rectly, stock or other evidences of ownership in 
one or more banks organized under the law of a 
foreign country or a dependency or insular pos­
session of the United States and not engaged, 
directly or indirectly, in any activity in the United 
States except as, in the judgment of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
shall be incidental to the international or foreign 
business of such foreign bank; and, notwithstand­
ing the provisions of section 23A of this Act, to 
make loans or extensions of credit to or for the 
account of such bank in the manner and within 
the limits prescribed by the Board by general or 
specific regulation or ruling. 
Such application shall specify the name and 
capital of the banking association filing it, the 
powers applied for, and the place or places where 
the banking or financial operations proposed are 
to be carried on. The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System shall have power to ap­
prove or to reject such application in whole or in 
part if for any reason the granting of such appli­
cation is deemed inexpedient, and shall also have 
power from time to time to increase or decrease 
the number of places where such banking opera­
tions may be carried on. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec. 601.] 
Every national banking association operating 
foreign branches shall be required to furnish in­
formation concerning the condition of such 
branches to the Comptroller of the Currency upon 
demand, and every member bank investing in the 
capital stock of banks or corporations described 
above shall be required to furnish information 
concerning the condition of such banks or corp­
orations to the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System upon demand, and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System may 
order special examinations of the said branches, 
banks, or corporations at such time or times as 
it may deem best. 
tU.S.C., title 12, sec. 602.] 
* * * * *  
Every such national banking association shall 
conduct the accounts of each foreign branch 
independently of the accounts of other foreign 
branches established by it and of its home office, 
and shall at the end of each fiscal period transfer 
to its general ledger the profit or loss accrued at 
each branch as a separate item. 
lU.S.C., title 12, sec. 604.] 
Regulations issued by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System under this section, 
in addition to regulating powers which a foreign 
branch may exercise under other provisions of 
law, may authorize such a foreign branch, sub­
ject to such conditions and requirements as such 
regulations may prescribe, to exercise such further 
powers as may be usual in connection with the 
transaction of the business of banking in the places 
where such foreign branch shall transact busi­
ness. Such regulations shall not authorize a foreign 
branch to engage in the general business of pro­
ducing, distributing, buying or selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise; nor, except to such lim­
ited extent as the Board may deem to be neces­
sary with respect to securities issued by any "for­
eign state" as defined in section 25(b) of this 
Act, shall such regulations authorize a foreign 
branch to engage or participate, directly or indi­
rectly, in the business of underwriting, selling, or 
distributing securities. 
[U.S.C., title 12, sec 604a.] 
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AMENDMENT TO REGULATION M 
ISSUED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
PART 213—FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF 
NATIONAL BANKS 
RESERVES AGAINST EURODOLLAR 
BORROWINGS 
1. Effective January 15, 1971, section 
213.7(a) is amended to read as follows: 
SECTION 213.7—RESERVES AGAINST 
FOREIGN BRANCH DEPOSITS 
(a) Transactions with parent bank. During 
each week of the four-week period beginning 
October 16, 1969, and during each week of 
each successive four-week ("maintenance") 
period, a member bank having one or more 
foreign branches shall maintain with the Re­
serve Bank of its district, as a reserve against 
its foreign branch deposits, a daily average 
balance equal to 20 per cent of the amount 
by which the daily average total of 
(1) net balances due from its domestic 
offices to such branches, and 
(2) assets (including participations) held 
by such branches which were acquired 
from its domestic offices, 
during the four-week ("computation") period 
ending on the Wednesday fifteen days before 
the beginning of the maintenance period, ex­
ceeds the greater of 
•'Excluding (1) assets so held on June 26, 1969, 
representing credit extended to persons not residents 
of the United States and (2) credit extended or re­
newed by a domestic office after June 26, 1969, to 
persons not residents of the United States to the ex­
tent such credit was not extended in order to replace 
credit outstanding on that date which was paid prior 
to its original maturity (sec definition of United States 
resident in footnote 9). 
(i) the lowest corresponding daily average 
total® for any computation period end­
ing after November 25, 1970, or 
(ii) 3 per cent of the member bank's daily 
average deposits subject to section 
204.5(a) of this chapter (Regulation 
D) during the current computation 
period, or the lowest corresponding daily 
average total® for any computation pe­
riod beginning on or after January 21, 
1971, and after the bank has had a 
foreign branch in operation for more 
than 90 days, whichever amount is the 
lesser; 
Provided, That the applicable base computed 
under (i) or (ii) shall be reduced by the daily 
average amount of any deposits of the member 
bank subject to section 204.5(c) of this chap­
ter (Regulation D) during the computation 
period. 
2a. The change provides a means by which 
a member bank may retain its reserve-free 
base with respect to its Eurodollar borrowings 
from its foreign branches by counting within 
its base the amount of purchases by its foreign 
branches of certain Export-Import Bank 
obligations. 
8 Including the principal amount paid by a foreign 
branch of the member bank for obligations held by 
such branch that were purchased by it from the Ex-
port-Import Bank of the United States pursuant to 
its program announced on January 15, 1971, and 
excluding assets representing credit extended to per­
sons not residents of the United States. 
CGO 2,SM 1971 
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AMENDMENT TO REGULATION M 
ISSUED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
I'ART 213—FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF 
NATIONAL BANKS 
RESERVES AGAINST EURODOLLAR 
BORROWINGS 
I. Effective April 1, 1971, Footnote 8 to 
section 213.7(a) of Regulation M is amended 
to read as follows: 
8/Including the principal amount paid by 
a foreign branch of the member bank for 
obligations held by such branch that were 
purchased by it from the Export-Import Bank 
of the United States pursuant to its program 
announced on January 15, 1971, or purchased 
by it from the United States Treasury pursuant 
to its program announced or. April 1, 1971, 
and excluding assets representing credit ex­
tended to persons not residents of the United 
States. 
2A. The change provides a means by which 
a member bank may retain its reserve-free base 
with respect to its Eurodollar borrowings from 
its foreign branches by counting within its base 
the amount of purchases by its foreign branches 
of certain United States Treasury obligations. 
B, The requiremenii of section 553 (b) 
of Title 5, United States Code, with respect to 
nofice, public participation, and deferred effec­
tive date were not followed in connection with 
this amendment because the Board found that 
following such procedures with respect to this 
amendment would be contrary to the public 
interest and serve no useful purpose. 
By order of the Board of Governors, April 
1, 1971. 
CGO 2.1'M 19/1 
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APPENDIX C 
AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
FOR THE STOCK ADJUSTMENT EQUATION 
In chapter four of this thesis generalized least squares Is 
applied to the stock adjustment equation in order to correct for 
auto-correlated error terms. The transformed equation Is of the 
form; 
^t - Pl^t-1 - Go(l-Pl) + 8i(Xt-PiXt_i) + (l-Y)(Yt_i-PiYt-2) + "t 
Fuller and Martin^ have shown that this procedure leads to 
biased estimates. In particular they have shown that positive auto­
correlation leads to a downward bias in the estimate of the stock 
adjustment coefficient y and an upward bias in (l-y)• 
As an alternative procedure, Fuller and Martin suggest esti­
mating the original equation, and then estimating 
t^~pl^ t~l " ôg/l-pi) + (^ t-l'^ l^^ t-l) + ^  ej-
Thls procedure yields consistent estimates and leads to a more 
powerful Durbin-Watson test. 
\'ayne A. Fuller and James E. Martin, "The Effects of Auto-
correlated Errors on the Statistical Estimation of Distributed Lag 
Models," Journal of Farm Economics, Volume XLII (February, 1961), 
71-82. 
